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Articles
Police "Science" in the Interrogation Room:
Seventy Years of Pseudo-Psychological
Interrogation Methods to Obtain Inadmissible
Confessions
BRIAN R. GALLINI*
Nearly all confessions obtained by interrogators nationwide are inadmissible, but
nonetheless admitted. In the process, police arrest the wrong suspect and allow the
guilty to go free. An unshakeable addiction to pseudo-scientific interrogation
methods-initially created in the z940s-is to blame. The so-called "Reid technique" of
interrogation was initially a welcome and revolutionary change from the violent "third
degree" method it replaced. But we no longer live in the 194os and, not surprisingly, we
no longer drive 194os automobiles, practice early-twentieth-century medicine, or dial
rotary phones. Why, then, are police still using 1940s methods of interrogation?
Moreover, the outdated Reid technique was premised on the very same principles that
underlie the lie detector. At the time of its creation, then, the Reid technique was crafted
from a "science" already discredited by nearly every court in the nation. From a policy
standpoint, continued reliance on the Reid technique does a disservice to our justice
system and unnecessarily risks obtaining inherently unreliable confessions. From an
evidentiary standpoint, the methodology underlying the Reid technique fails every
aspect of the Supreme Court's standards governing the admission of expert evidence.
This Article therefore contends that all confessions obtained pursuant to the Reid
method are-and were-absolutely inadmissible.
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INTRODUCTION
Kill your woman and a good detective will come close to real tears
as he touches your shoulder and tells you how he knows that you must
have loved her, that it wouldn't be so hard for you to talk about if you
didn't. Beat your child to death and a police detective will wrap his arm
around you in the interrogation room, telling you about how he beats
his own children all the time, how it wasn't your fault if the kid up and
died on you. Shoot a friend over a poker hand and that same detective
will lie about your dead buddy's condition, telling you that the victim is
in stable condition at Hopkins and probably won't press charges, which
wouldn't amount to more than assault with intent even if he does.
Murder a man with an accomplice and the detective will walk your co-
conspirator past the open door of your interrogation room, then say
your bunky's going home tonight because he gave a statement making
you the triggerman. And if that same detective thinks you can be
bluffed, he might tell you that they've got your prints on the weapon,
or that there are two eyewitnesses who have picked your photo from
an array, or that the victim made a dying declaration in which he
named you as his assailant.'
How do detectives know these tricks? Intuition? Luck? On-the-job
experience? Perhaps it is one or all of those reasons, but more than likely
I. DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON IRHE KILLING STREETS 203 (1991).
[Vol. 61:52953o0
POLICE "SCIENCE"
investigators learned these techniques from John E. Reid & Associates -
teachers of "the leading interview and interrogation approach used today
in both the law enforcement and business communities."2 Premised on
the use of nine specific steps, "the Reid technique," as it is known, is
designed to identify the guilty without inducing false confessions. But
how can the Reid technique be sure to distinguish true from false
confessions? Moreover, what supporting data did John E. Reid and his
colleague, Fred E. Inbau, have at the time they authored their
interrogation manual that rendered them authorities on psychology in
the interrogation room? The answers may surprise you: The Reid
technique cannot distinguish between true and false confessions. Reid
and Inbau had no supporting scientific or experimental data.
In other words, the so-called validity of the Reid technique is
illusory; it is simply a medium to bolster interrogators' belief that they
have an advantage over their suspect. And as to the backgrounds of Reid
and Inbau, suffice it to say for now that they were no psychologists.
Created in a time when the "third degree" method of interrogation
was waning in popularity,4 the Reid technique was initially a welcome
and revolutionary change from the violent methods it replaced.5 Before
the first iteration in 1942 of what became the Reid technique,6 officers
interrogating suspects often got the suspect to "come clean" by resorting
to barbaric tactics like using their bare fists, stripping the suspect naked,
threatening the suspect, or depriving him of food and water.7
A classic example of the "third degree" appears in the Supreme
Court's decision in Chambers v. Florida, which described the May 13,
2. John E. Reid & Associates, Inc., Company Information, http://www.reid.com/r-about.html
(last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
3. FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 212 (4th ed. 2001) ("It must
be remembered that none of the steps is apt to make an innocent person confess . . . .").
4. The National Commission on Law Observance in Law Enforcement issued a Report on
Lawlessness in Law Enforcement to President Herbert Hoover in 1931 documenting and decrying the
use of the third degree. See NAT'L COMM. ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931) [hereinafter "WICKERSHAM REPORT," named for its chair];
see also Richard A. Leo, The Third Degree and the Origins of Psychological Interrogation in the United
States, in 20 INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 37, 42 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004)
("The 'third degree' is an overarching term that refers to a variety of coercive interrogation strategies,
ranging from psychological duress such as prolonged confinement to extreme physical violence and
torture.").
5. Robert McG. Thomas Jr., Fred Inbau, 89, Criminologist Who Perfected Interrogation, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 1998, at B9 (crediting Inbau for developing a method of interrogation to replace the
"third degree"); see JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE
USE OF FORCE 51 (1993) (calling Inbau and Reid leaders of the reformist movement away from third
degree practices); see also John F. Keenan, Memories of Professor Fred E Inbau, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1281, 1281 (1999) ("Inbau was a giant in the field of criminal law who left a legacy that
will be remembered well into the next millennium.").
6. FRED E. INBAU, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 71-I 18 (1942) (outlining a series
of techniques for criminal interrogations).
7. See, e.g., WICKERSHAM REPORT, supra note 4, at 61463.
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1933, robbing and murder of an elderly white man in Pompano, Florida.8
Concerned about an increasingly "enraged community,"9  Broward
County police rounded up and arrested between twenty-five to forty
African Americans within twenty-four hours after the killing.'0 The
investigation gradually began to focus on the four petitioners who, along
with the other arrestees, endured a weeklong interrogation." During that
time, officers repeatedly questioned petitioners, oftentimes in the
presence of between four to ten white guards." As the investigation wore
on, officers elected to question petitioners during an "all night vigil." 3 At
no point during their week-long interrogation were petitioners allowed
to confer with counsel or chat with a friend.' 4 Instead, the evidence
suggested that petitioners were denied food and sleep, continuously
threatened, and mistreated until they finally agreed to confess." The
Court, in condemning the officers' methods as an unconstitutional
violation of petitioners' Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights,
scornfully emphasized that "no such practice as that disclosed by this
record shall send any accused to his death ."i6
The facts of Chambers nicely illustrate the brutal reality of
interrogations in the early 19oos." The Reid method therefore filled a
gaping hole in interrogation methods, or, perhaps more accurately, the
absence of interrogation methods." In 1942, Northwestern University law
professor Fred Inbau laid the foundation for what ironically became the
Reid method in his publication titled Lie Detection and Criminal
Interrogation." After John Reid began a working relationship with
Inbau, the pair revised Inbau's earlier work and published Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions in 1962.20 Now in its fourth edition,2 the
jointly authored publication now often known simply as "the Manual" is
8. 309 U.S. 227, 229 (1940).
9. Id. (quoting Chambers v. State, 187 So. 156, 157 (Fla. 1939)).
io. Id.
ii. Id. at 23o.
12. Id. at 231.
13. Id. at 23o. The interrogation sessions were so long that the supervising sheriff was unable to
interrogate the arrestees at night because he was too tired. Id.
14. Id. at 231.
15. Id. at 233-35.
16. Id. at 241.
17. Indeed, the Wickersham Report documents io6 usages of the third degree from thirty-one
separate state jurisdictions and four federal circuits. See WICKERSHAM REPORT, supra note 4, at 53. Yet
the Report cautioned that such numbers were hardly accurate given that learning about usages of the
third degree was the exception rather than the rule. Id. at 53-54.
18. To be fair, W.R. Kidd published the first police interrogation training manual in American
history in 1940. See Leo. supra note 4. at 39-4o.
19. INBAU, supra note 6, at 71-118.
20. See FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962).
21. INBAU ET AL., supra note 3.
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widely viewed as the predominant interrogation training tool in the
country.2
The Manual, and the techniques it teaches, are hardly without
detractors. For the most part, scholars focus on the potential for certain
interrogation methods endorsed by the Manual to induce suspects to
confess falsely. Yet no article has examined, on a more basic level,
whether Reid and Inbau possessed the requisite background necessary to
credibly author the "Bible" of interrogation manuals. Surely the Reid
method's long-proffered contention that it brings science into the
interrogation room correspondingly suggests that it is rooted in science."
22. See, e.g., CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY ME): WHY
WE JUSTIFY FOOLISH BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND HURTFUL AcTs 141 (2007) (characterizing the Reid
and Inbau text as "[t]he Bible of interrogation methods"); WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA's WANING
PROTECTIONs 25 (2001) ("Of all the interrogation manuals, the Inbau Manual, as it is commonly known,
has been the most influential."); Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for
Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAM ORB. L.J. 791, 8o8
(2oo6) ("The interrogation method most widely publicized and probably most widely used is known as
the Reid Technique .... ); Leo, supra note 4, at 63 (noting that the Criminal Interrogation and
Confessions text is "the most well-known and influential in the United States"); Max Minzner,
Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29 CARDozo L. REV. 2557, 2560 (2008) ("The most
influential current training method for law enforcement is the Reid technique, outlined in Reid and
Inbau's book Criminal Interrogation and Confessions."); Charles Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96
CAL. L. REV. 1519, 1532 (2008) ("The largest national provider of training in interrogation techniques
is Chicago-based John E. Reid & Associates."); Marvin Zalman & Brad Smith, The Attitudes of Police
Executives Toward Miranda and Interrogation Policies, 97 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 873, 919 (2007)
("[W]e believe [that the training provided by Reid & Associates] is the largest and best-known
training program for police interrogations."); see also Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social
Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions, 16
STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y 189, 190 (1997) (referring to the Inbau and Reid manual as "the most popular
police training manual"); John E. Reid & Associates Company Information, supra note 2 ("Our book,
Criminal Interrogation and Confessions (4th edition, 2001) is considered by the courts and
practitioners to be the 'Bible' for interviewing and interrogation techniques.").
23. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming
Apr. 2010); Mark A. Godsey, Reliability Lost, False Confessions Discovered, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 623, 628
(2007); see also Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 58 (1987) ("The cases in which we believe an innocent person was
convicted on the basis of a false confession range from those in which the police used 'third degree'
methods to others where less brutal tactics were employed.").
24. See United States v. Lanza, 356 F. Supp. 27, 31 (M.D. Fla. 1972) ("By 1966, [Reid] began
advocating the acceptance of polygraph tests as reliable scientific evidence."); Fred E. Inbau (1909-
1998) Papers, Series 17/28, at i (Nw. Univ. Archives, 1930-1998) (unpublished papers) [hereinafter
Inbau Papers] ("[E]very step in the promotion of scientific crime detection is a step towards the
abolition of cruel and ineffective methods of establishing criminal identity, and also a step towards the
realization of criminal trial unhampered by technical procedure and unreliable evidence." (quoting
Fred E. Inbau, Science Versus the Criminal, NU ALUMNI NEWS, Jan. 1935, at 25)), available at http://
www.library.northwestern.edularchives/findingaids/fred-inbau.pdf; see also, e.g., INBAU & REID, supra
note 20, at vii ("Criminal Interrogation and Confessions is devoted to a discussion of the psychological
tactics and techniques of effective interrogation. .. ); Brian C. Jayne & Joseph P. Buckley, III,
Criminal Interrogation Techniques on Trial, SECURITY MGMT., Oct. I, 1992, at 64 (arguing that Reid
interrogation techniques represent necessary "highly sophisticated psychological techniques"); Leo,
supra note 4, at 63 (observing that even Inbau's first interrogation text in 1942 "attempted to establish
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Hardly." This Article tells the story of Reid and Inbau's work,
individually and collectively, and concludes that all of it is, at base,
premised on nothing.
The story of Reid and Inbau's work also reveals that the so-called
nine-step Reid technique (and the Behavior Analysis Interview that
precedes it) is no different from the lie-detector technique-also created
by Reid and Inbau. Given courts' proper unwillingness to admit the
results of a lie-detector test,26 this Article contends that future courts
should be similarly unwilling to admit confessions obtained pursuant to
the Reid technique. This Article further asserts that all past confessions
obtained pursuant to the Reid technique were based on "junk science"
a scientific basis for police interrogation in order to eradicate the use of threatening or abusive tactics
from interrogation").
25. See, e.g., GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND
TESTIMONY 48 (1992) (observing that the Reid technique, among other manuals, is "based on
experience rather than objective and scientific data"); Saul M. Kassin & Christina T. Fong, "I'm
Innocent!": Effects of Training on Judgments of Truth and Deception in the Interrogation Room, 23
LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 499, 512 (1999) (conducting a study on the validity of the Reid technique and
concluding that it "may not be effective-and, indeed, may be counterproductive-as a method of
distinguishing truth and deception"); Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess
Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENv. U. L. REV. 979, 986 n.38 (1997) ("Police
trainers and interrogation manuals mislead detectives into believing that they can divine whether a
suspect is innocent or guilty from simple non-verbal and behavioral responses to their questions.").
26. Federal courts are disinclined to admit polygraph evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Gill. 513
F.3d 836, 846 (8th Cir. 2oo8) ("Our cases make clear polygraph evidence is disfavored."); United
States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 469 n.8 (6th Cir. 2oo6) ("Admission of polygraph evidence is
disfavored in this Circuit. .. ."); United States v. Prince-Oyibo, 320 F-3d 494, 501 (4th Cir. 2003)
(reaffirming inadmissibility of polygraph evidence); United States v. Messina, 131 F-3d 36, 42 (2d Cir.
1997) (declining to admit polygraph results in sentencing proceedings); United States v. Kwong, 69
F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding polygraph evidence inadmissible pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 because of its potential to mislead and confuse the jury); United States v. Sherlin, 67
F.3d I208, 1217 (6th Cir. 1995) (disallowing polygraph evidence on Rule 403 basis): Conti v.
Commissioner, 39 F.3d 658, 662-63 (6th Cir. 1994) (same); Palmer v. City of Monticello, 31 F.3d 1499.
15o6 (ioth Cir. 1994) (holding polygraph evidence inadmissible pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
403 because of its potential to mislead and confuse the jury).
State courts are equally skeptical. See, e.g., Bloom v. People, 185 P-3d 797. 807 (Colo. 2oo8)
("Th[e] per se ban is an evidentiary rule rooted in the concern that polygraph evidence will prejudice
the jury's evaluation of a witness's credibility."); Thornton v. State, 620 S.E.2d 356, 360 (Ga. 2005)
("The results of a polygraph examination are inadmissible except by stipulation of the parties. .. ."):
Wilkins v. State, 190 P.3d 957, 970 (Kan. 2oo8) ("[R]eference to [a polygraph] examination ... is
prohibited."); State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d ii16, 1128 (La. 1993) (excluding polygraph testimony because
it would infringe upon the province of the jury); State v. Jones, 753 N.W.2d 677, 690 (Minn. 2oo8)
("Polygraph examinations are inadmissible."); State ex rel. Kemper v. Vincent, 191 S.W.3d 45. 49 (Mo.
2oo6) ("The results of a polygraph examination generally are inadmissible in Missouri criminal
trials."); State v. Hameline, 188 P-3d 1052, 1055 (Mont. 2oo8) ("[P]olygraph results are
inadmissible... ."); State v. Lyon, 744 P.2d 231, 232 (Or. 1987); Darling v. State, 262 S.W-3d 913, 920
(Tex. Ct. App. 2008) ("The results of a polygraph examination are generally inadmissible for any
reason because such testing is inherently unreliable."); Fowlkes v. Commonwealth, 663 S.E.2d 98, 101-
02 (Va. Ct. App. 2008) ("[A] polygraph examination has no proper evidentiary use .. "(quoting
Bennett v. Commonwealth, 511 S.E.2d 439, 445 (Va. Ct. App. 1999))).
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and therefore never should have been admitted against the confessing
defendant.
Part I details the nine steps of the outdated Reid technique.?Part211
details the biographical and professional stories of Fred E. Inbau and
John E. Reid. In doing so, Part II takes a critical look at the empirical
basis for their research on interrogation methods and their development
of the polygraph technique.2'8 From that examination, Part II first
concludes that the backgrounds of Inbau and Reid reflect their inability
to credibly create or suggest a "scientific" approach to interrogation. Part
II then concludes that the Reid technique lacks empirical support.
With those conclusions as background, Part III tests the Reid
method's claimed basis in "science." Given that the Reid technique
mirrors a polygraph test by attempting to create human lie detectors29
and that polygraph results are inadmissible in court, Part III first argues
that confessions obtained pursuant to the Reid technique should
similarly be inadmissible. Wholly apart from the relationship between
the polygraph and the Reid technique, however, Part III further
contends that the Reid method's claimed scientific basis requires that it
comport with the Supreme Court's standards for admitting expert
evidence any time prosecutors seek to introduce a confession obtained
by an interrogator trained in that method. Given that the Reid technique
is in fact not based on any generally accepted scientific method, Part III
contends that all officer testimony about confessions obtained pursuant
to the Reid technique was-and is-inadmissible. Regardless of the
underlying theory, though, the startling final conclusion is obvious: all
confessions taken pursuant to the Reid method are in fact inadmissible.
27. The techniques currently suggested by the Reid method are nearly identical to those
promoted by Fred E. Inbau in 1942. Compare INBAU ET AL., supra note 3, with INBAU & REID, supra
note 20, and Leo, supra note 4, at 72 ("[T]he modem version of Inbau et al., manual (1986, 2001) has
reorganized the interrogation techniques it advocates from the earlier individualized, trial and error or
scattershot approach to a 'Nine-step' model of systematic and unfolding pressure, persuasion,
deception and manipulation."). Perhaps it is hardly a stretch to suggest that modern interrogators are,
at base, relying on techniques created in the 1940s. Yet surely the law, the sophistication of criminals,
and, more importantly, psychological research has developed since then. The Reid method's failure to
adapt to these critical developments provides an early indication of its infirmity.
28. The technique in its modern day form "collects physiological data from at least three systems
in the human body." American Polygraph Association, Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.polygraph.org/section/resources/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Jan. 12, 20oo). First,
"[c]onvoluted rubber tubes that are placed over the examinee's chest and abdominal area will record
respiratory activity. [Then,] [t]wo small metal plates, attached to the fingers, will record sweat gland
activity, and a blood pressure cuff, or similar device will record cardiovascular activity." Id.
29. Leo, supra note 4, at 66 ("The Behavioral Analysis Interview is premised on the same
behavioral assumptions and underlying theory as the so-called lie-detector: The Behavioral Analysis
Interview teaches interrogators that it is their job to act, in effect, as a human polygraph -an endeavor
that may be fraught with even more potential for error than the lie detector itself.").
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1. THE REID TECHNIQUE EXPLAINED
The prevalence of the nine-step Reid technique-as taught in
seminars and described in the Criminal Interrogation and Confessions
text-cannot be overstated.30 Indeed, John E. Reid & Associates is the
largest, best-known provider of interrogation training in the United
States. 3' Officers from every state and Canadian province use the Reid
method." A recent nationwide survey of police departments revealed
that two-thirds of state police departments train some or all of their
department's officers in the Reid method." The Reid technique also
claims international reach: according to the most recent edition of Reid
and Inbau's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, "[t]he technique is
now taught in seminars across the United States, Canada, Europe, and
Asia."" Even the United States military law enforcement uses the Reid
technique." In total, Reid & Associates boasts that over 500,000 law
enforcement and security professionals have attended its interrogation
seminars since they were first offered in 1974.36 It seems, then, that no
critique of the Reid method could begin without first examining it in
some detail.
The training seminars described in the preceding paragraph are of
course grounded in the Reid textbook, Criminal Interrogation and
Confessions.37 The extensive 626-page interrogation training manual
30. Although there are of course competing training manuals, they too generally follow principles
that are aligned with the Reid method. See Christine S. Scott-Hawyward, Explaining Juvenile False
Confessions: Adolescent Development and Police Interrogation, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 53. 66-67
(2007) (stating that eighty-five percent of all interrogation manuals recommend a two-step process to
determine guilt or innocence, just as the Reid method instructs). Indeed, in a recent survey of police
investigators from California, Texas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Florida, and Canada. investigators
cited to the same room setup and interrogation techniques listed by the Reid method, regardless of
whether the respondent knew the Reid name. See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and
Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs, 31 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 381, 389
(2007).
31. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. The Police Law Institute, a proprietary school.
trains and provides instructional manuals to police in Illinois, Ohio, Missouri, and Florida. See The
Police Law Institute, http://www.policelawinstitute.org/plims/ (last visited Jan. 12, zoio). More relevant
to this Article, their police training businesses include John E. Reid & Associates. See Zalman &
Smith, supra note 22, at 885 n.68.
32. John E. Reid & Associates, Inc., Interviewing and Interrogation, http://www.reid.com/
training-programs/interviewoverview.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
33. Zalman & Smith, supra note 22, at 920.
34. INBAU ET AL., supra note 3, at ix; accord John E. Reid & Associates, Company Information,
supra note 2 ("Our firm has been awarded contracts for training from NATO; the Bavarian and Berlin
Law Enforcement communities in Germany; and have conducted training programs in Bosnia-
Herzegovina; the Czech Republic; the United Arab Emerits; Singapore; Japan; Mexico; Canada;
Belgium; and, South Korea.").
35. Peter Kageleiry. Jr., Psychological Police Interrogation Methods: Pseudoscience in the
Interrogation Roorn Obscures Justice in the Courtroom, 193 MIL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2007).
36. John E. Reid & Associates, Inc., Interviewing and Interrogation, supra note 32.
37 Weisselberg, supra note 22, at 5530.
536 (Vol. 61:529
POLICE "SCIENCE"
begins by distinguishing an "interview" from an "interrogation." 5 An
interview, according to the text, is a nonaccusatory information gathering
exercise that may take place at the beginning of an investigation and in a
variety of environments. 39 The interview, more specifically described by
the text as a "Behavior Analysis Interview,"4 o should be "free flowing
and relatively unstructured" in order to allow the interviewer to collect
unanticipated information and make a credibility determination by
evaluating the suspect's behavioral responses.4 ' Along the way, the
examiner should also "establish a level of rapport and trust with the
suspect that cannot be accomplished during an accusatory
interrogation."42
By contrast, an interrogation takes place "only when the
investigator is reasonably certain of the suspect's guilt," which certainty
may arise from "the suspect's behavior during an interview."43 The
interrogation itself must occur in a controlled environment, during which
the interrogator displays an air of unwavering confidence in the suspect's
guilt." The interrogator should employ the nine-step Reid technique,
described below, during questioning.4 5
The moment when a police officer elects to conclude an interview
and commence an interrogation is critical. Given that interrogation is a
"guilt-presumptive process,"46 the investigators should make a
determination during the Behavior Analysis Interview about the
suspect's credibility before commencing a formal interrogation.47 To do
so, the investigator should establish the suspect's normal behavioral
patterns and then-in response to "behavior-provoking questions"-
38. INBAU ET AL., supra note 3, at 5.
39. Id. at 5-6. The interviewer should be someone who has "an easygoing confidence that allows
the subject to feel comfortable telling the truth but uncomfortable lying." Id. at 67. That suggestion
comes under the heading "Interviewer Qualifications," yet no substantive interviewer qualifications
are mentioned. Id. at 66-67.
40. Id. at 173-91 (chapter describing the Behavior Analysis Interview).
41. Id. at6-7.
42. Id. at9.
43. Id. at 8.
44. Id. at 7 ("Deceptive suspects are not likely to offer admissions against self-interest unless they
are convinced that the investigator is certain of their guilt.").
45. The authors emphasize that not every interrogation will require the investigator to employ all
nine steps. Id. at 214. "What is essential for success. . . is for the investigator to recognize what stage a
suspect is in and to respond appropriately to the suspect's behaviors and psychological orientation at
any given stage of the interrogation process." Id. at 216.
46. Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the
Literature and Issues, PSYCHOL. ScL Pun. INT., Nov. 2004, at 33, 41.
47. See INBAU ET AL., supra note 3, at 9 (outlining the importance of interviewing a suspect before
interrogating the suspect).
48. Inbau et al. suggest several behavior-provoking questions, such as the "purpose" question,
wherein the interviewer asks the suspect about his understanding of the purpose for the interview. Id.
at 173. Another example is the "history/you" question, in which the interviewer "should succinctly
state the issue under investigation (history) and ask the subject if he was involved in committing the
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evaluate the suspect's attitudes, verbal behavior, paralinguistic behavior
(i.e., the suspect's speech characteristics), and nonverbal behavior.49 In
the words of Inbau et al., the examiner must give "analytical
consideration" to the suspect's "behavioral responses.""
From a suspect's responses to between ten to fifteen behavior-
provoking questions, the investigator "will generally be able to classify
the overall responses to those questions as either fitting the description
of an innocent or guilty suspect."" And, assuming the investigator is
''unable to eliminate a suspect based on behavior assessments or
investigative findings," that investigator should hastily follow up with a
formal interrogation.
The Reid technique's nine-step method comes into play as soon as
our hypothetical investigator elects to follow his Behavior Analysis
Interview with a formal interrogation." Before the investigator
commences an interrogation, though, Inbau et al. advise the investigator
to set up a private soundproof room within the police station that is free
from distractions and furnished sparsely with straight-backed chairs.54
The room should also be equipped with a one-way observation mirror so
that other detectives can evaluate the suspect's "behavior symptoms."5 5
Arranging the room in this manner isolates the suspect and removes the
suspect from any familiar surroundings, thereby heightening the
suspect's anxiety while incentivizing the suspect to extricate himself from
the situation.56
The interrogator should then "allow the suspect to sit in the
interview room alone for about five minutes."57 Doing so will promote
crime (you)." Id. at 175. Although Inbau et al. provide numerous other examples, see id. at 176-84, the
overarching goal is for the investigator to discern deceptive responses from guilty suspects. See id. at
173 ("Research has demonstrated that innocent subjects tend to respond differently to these
specialized questions than do deceptive subjects.").
49. Id. at 128-53.
50. Id. at 173.
51. Id. at 190.
52. Id. at 191. Somewhat confusingly, although the investigator is charged with making a
determination about whether the suspect offers deceptive responses, for "court purposes." it is "not
recommended that the investigator categorize a suspect's response to behavior-provoking questions as
truthful or deceptive at the time each question is asked." Id. at 19o n.2. This type of testimony,
according to Inbau et al., is "best left for an expert in behavior analysis" because a defense attorney
could ask the investigator "to explain exactly why he classified each response as he did, to explain the
research findings supporting his classification, and to comment on the differential diagnosis of the
response." Id. At the risk of asking the obvious, why should a defense attorney not ask this of a
testifying investigator when it is the investigator, not a behavioral analysis expert, who determined that
the suspect was not truthful during the interview?
53. In other words, at the point when the investigator becomes-in his opinion-4"reasonably
certain" of the suspect's guilt. Id. at 209.
54. Id. at 57-64.
55. Id. at 59.
56. See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 46, at 42.
57. INBAU ET AL., supra note 3, at 216.
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insecurity in the suspect and cause the suspect "[a]dditional doubts and
concerns."58 The investigator should also preliminarily "prepare and have
on hand an evidence case folder, or a simulation of one." 59 Doing so will
allow the investigator to make reference to the case file throughout the
interrogation, even if the "file" contains nothing or simply contains blank
6opaper.
At the outset of the formal interrogation,6 , the investigator should
enter with an air of confidence and, if the suspect is not seated, he should
instruct the suspect to sit.62 Step one of the Reid technique then
specifically directs the interrogator to "initiate the interrogation with a
direct statement indicating absolute certainty in the suspect's guilt."63
Immediately thereafter, the interrogator should pause and say, "I want to
sit down with you so that we can get this straightened out. Okay?"6 4 No
matter what the suspect says in response, "the investigator will proceed
to offer a reason as to why it is important for the suspect to tell the
truth."6
After directly confronting the suspect, step two of the Reid method
directs the interrogator to begin developing a "theme." 66 The theme
should present the suspect with a moral-not legal-excuse for
committing the offense." "The selected theme may be based upon a
simple, common sense analysis of a suspect's background and probable
motive that triggered the criminal conduct." 68 So, if a suspect admits
during the Behavior Analysis Interview that he might be tempted to take
money from someone at gunpoint if he were "desperate," then the
interrogator should consider a theme justifying the suspect's commission
58. Id. at 217.
59. Id.
6o. Id.
61. Inbau et al. assures the reader, without a supporting citation (as always), that "[i]t must be
remembered that none of the steps is apt to make an innocent person confess and that all the steps are
legally as well as morally justifiable." Id. at 212.
62. Id. at 217-18, 221 fig.13-2.
63. Id. at 218-19. "If the suspect perceives that the investigator is not certain of his guilt, he is
unlikely to confess." Id. at 218. This is a -"maximization" technique designed to intimidate and impress
upon the suspect the futility of denial. See Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An
Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 97 J. Cus. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 261 (2oo6). Maximization
techniques condoned by the Reid method may also include confronting suspects with real and false
evidence, refusing to accept denials, accusing suspects of lying, identifying inconsistencies in suspects'
stories, and emphasizing the implausibility of suspects' claims. Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation
Room, 86 J. Clm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 277-79 (1996).
64. INBAU ET AL., supra note 3, at 222.
65. ld. at 213.
66. Id. at 232.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 234.
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of robbery out of dire financial need or possible drug addiction.69 Or, if a
suspect suggests during the Behavior Analysis Interview that certain
circumstances may justify a homicide, then the interrogator should
thematically condemn the victim of the suspect's crime. 0 Regardless, this
"minimization" 7, technique is designed to "offer a 'crutch' for the suspect
as he moves toward a confession."72
Often, however, the suspect meets the interrogator's theme
presentation with a denial. The third step therefore counsels
interrogators on how to handle a suspect's denials either after the direct
positive confrontation (step one), or following the interrogator's theme
presentation (step two). 73 Should a denial follow step one, Inbau et al.
advise interrogators to ignore a suspect's "weak denial.",7  Should the
suspect offer a more forceful denial, then the investigator should
"reassert his confidence in the suspect's guilt" while directing the
discussion back to the facts of the case." Little changes in the context of a
post-theme denial; the interrogator is advised to evaluate the veracity of
the denial while returning to the interrogation theme.76
Step four addresses how interrogators should respond when a
suspect's simple denial matures into an "objection." An objection,
according to the text, "will ordinarily take the form of a reason as to why
the accusation is wrong."7  Although it will not contain evidence of
innocence, the objection is designed to shake the interrogator's
69. Id. More specifically, the investigator might-during the Behavior Analysis Interview-ask
the suspect the following: "[u]nder any circumstances do you think the person who killed George
should be given some consideration?" Id. If the suspect responds that it "depend[s] on why it
happened," then the text suggests this theme: "The suspect did not plan to kill the victim but rather
acted on the spur of the moment because of the victim's behavior." Id.
70. Id. Assuming the interrogator cannot develop a theme from the suspect's interview behavior
or comments, the Manual suggests seven fallback themes: (x) "Sympathize with the Suspect by Saying
that Anyone Else Under Similar Circumstances Might Have Done the Same Thing," id. at 241, (2)
"Reduce the Suspect's Feeling of Guilt by Minimizing the Moral Seriousness of the Offense," id. at
244; (3) "Suggest a Less Revolting and More Morally Acceptable Motivation or Reason for the
Offense Than That Which Is Known or Presumed," id. at 247; (4) "Sympathize with Suspect by
Condemning Others," id. at 254; (5) "Appeal to a Suspect's Pride by Well-Selected Flattery," id. at
268; (6) "Point out Possibility of Exaggeration on Part of Accuser or Victim, or Exaggerate Nature
and Seriousness of the Event itself," id. at 27I; and (7) "Point Out to the Suspect Grave Consequences
and Futility of Continuation of Criminal Behavior," id. at 278. Again, these are the very same
unchanged techniques suggested in a somewhat less organized fashion by Inbau back in 1942. Cf.
INBAU, supra note 6.
71. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 46, at 43.
72. INBAU ET1AL., supra note 3, at 232.
73. Id. at 305-06.
74. Id at 306.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 334-28.
77. Id. at 330. More specifically, an "objection" surpasses a mere denial by offering a brief
explanation, like "I couldn't have done it," "But I've got money in the bank," or "I wouldn't do a thing
like that." Id. at 333.
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confidence in the suspect's guilt.?8 A suspect's willingness to resort to
objections is a good thing, though, say Inbau et al., because "the suspect's
move from a denial to an objection is a good indication of a concealment
of the truth."79 Substantively, the interrogator should "act as though the
statement was expected" (e.g., by saying "I was hoping you'd say that" or
"I'm glad you mentioned that") and thereafter "reverse the significance
of the suspect's objection and return to the interrogation theme without
delay."
Having instructed interrogators on how to handle denials and
objections, the Manual turns its attention, at step five, to teaching the
interrogator how to procure and retain the suspect's attention.81 This step
is particularly important given the propensity of suspects "to
psychologically withdraw from the interrogation and ignore the
investigator's theme." 2 To avoid that result, interrogators are advised to
(i) move their chairs physically closer to the suspect,8' (2) establish eye
contact,84 (3) use visual aids,8' or (4) ask hypothetical questions.86
Step six then counsels interrogators on how to handle a suspect's
passive mood." In short, this step first advises the interrogator to tailor
the general theme established at step two specifically to this suspect.88 If,
after hearing this theme restatement, the suspect "drifts into a passive
mood," then the interrogator should move closer to the suspect and
begin urging the suspect to tell the truth.8 9 Working at the "peak of
sincerity," the investigator should utilize "soft and warm"9 eye contact
78. Id. at 33 1-
79. Id. ("An innocent suspect will usually remain steadfast with the denial alone and will feel no
need to embellish it at all.").
8o. Id. at 334-35. Reversing the significance of the suspect's statement requires the interrogator
to agree with the suspect's objection, while simultaneously pointing out the negative aspects were the
objection untruthful. Id. at 336. The text offers as an example the suspect's denial of "that's
ridiculous . .. I don't even own a gun" in the context of a hypothetical armed robbery case. Id. at 336
tbl. 13-2. In response to the denial, the interrogator might say something like:
I'm glad you mentioned that, Joe, because it tells me that it wasn't your idea to do this; that
one of your buddies talked you into this, handed you the gun, and then the whole thing
happened. You see, Joe, if you did own a gun and carried it in that night, ready to use it, to
kill somebody if they got in your way, that's one thing. But if the other guy stuck it in your
hand, to use it just to scare everybody that's something else again ....
Id. (alteration in original).
81. Id. at 337-45.
82. Id. at 338.
83. Id. at 339.
84. Id. at 341.
85. Id. at 342.
86. Id. at 343.
87. Id. at 345 52.
88. Id. at 346.
89. Id. at 347.
90. Id. at 349.
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while speaking in a low tone and encouraging the suspect to "tell the
truth for the sake of his own conscience, mental relief, or moral well-
being, as well as 'for the sake of everybody concerned.' 9 ' The
investigator should continue with this process "until the suspect shows
some physical sign of resignation, at which time step seven should
immediately be employed.""
At step seven, the officer should present to the suspect a so-called
"alternative question," which provides the suspect "a choice between two
explanations for possible commission of the crime."' One explanation is
designed to be more "acceptable" or "understandable" than the other.94
For example, in a theft case, the interrogator may ask "[d]id you blow
that money on booze. . . or did you need it to help out your family?"'
The interrogator should then follow with a statement supporting the
more morally acceptable alternative. Inbau et al. suggest that "the
alternative question has allowed [the suspect] the opportunity to tell the
truth while saving face."97
Once the suspect accepts his involvement in the crime based on a
morally understandable reason, step eight instructs the interrogator on
how to deduce details about the offense from the suspect." This step calls
upon the interrogator to "employ a great deal of patience"' throughout
several gradual stages, beginning with offering the suspect a "statement
of reinforcement."'" The statement is a brief one like "[g]ood, that's
what I thought it was all along," which should be followed by working to
develop the suspect's gradual acknowledgement of guilt.'0' The
interrogator should then "return to the beginning of the crime and
attempt to develop information that can be corroborated by further
investigation.,,IO2 Finally, although only one interrogator should elicit the
initial oral confession," another person should witness that oral
91. Id. at 347.
92. Id. at 349.
93. Id. at 353.
94. Id. at 214.
95. Id. at 353. Alternatively, the interrogator might ask, "Joe, was this money used to take care of
some bills at home, or was it used to gamble?" Id. at 360.
96. Id. at 359. The alternative question might then be followed by a "negative supporting
statement" like "[y]ou don't seem to be the kind of person who would do something like this in order
to use it for gambling. If you were that kind of person, I wouldn't want to waste my time with you, but
I don't think you're like that." Id. at 360. Or, the investigator might follow the alternative question
with a "positive supporting statement" such as, "I'm sure this money was for your family, for some
bills at home. That's something even an honest person might do, if he was thinking of his family." Id.
97. Id. at 353.
98. Id. at 365-74.
99. Id. at 365.
ioo. Id. at 366.
10o. Id. at 366469.
102. Id. at 369.
103. Id. at 371.
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confession once the first investigator "is satisfied that adequate details
surrounding the commission of the crime have been obtained."'0 4
The ninth and final step counsels interrogators on how to convert
the oral confession into a written one.o' Step nine spans more than
twenty pages of text and, in doing so, (i) emphasizes the importance of
documentation,o6 (2) teaches how to again provide the warnings required
by Miranda v. Arizona,'" (3) instructs how to prepare and form the
confession,"'8 (4) outlines best practices for safeguarding the effectiveness
of the confession,"'u and (5) suggests engaging in a postconfession
interview with the suspect."0
II. DECONSTRUCTING THE REID TECHNIQUE
With the impact of the Reid technique on the law enforcement
community and its asserted basis in psychology in mind, one might
justifiably wonder what backgrounds its creators possessed and how the
Reid technique grew to such prominent heights. The surprising answer,
as this Part details, is that there exists no basis in psychology to support
the Reid technique. This Part therefore seeks to wholly deconstruct the
validity of the Reid method by first briefly outlining in section A the
backgrounds of its creators, John E. Reid and Fred E. Inbau. Section B
thereafter examines and dissects, in detail, the historical rise of Inbau
and Reid's work.
104. Id. at 372.
105. Id. at 374-97.
io6. Id. at 375. According to the authors, documenting the confession is exceptionally important
because many suspects will later either deny that they confessed or claim that their confession was
wrongfully induced. Id. A written and signed confession not only limits controversy about the
believability of the confession, but also practically eliminates any argument about the existence of a
confession. Id.
107. Id. at 376-77 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). Before reducing the suspect's
confession to writing, the authors suggest reading Miranda warnings to the suspect. Id. at 376.
Particularly where the suspect received warnings at the outset of interrogation, warnings should be
repeated so as to "mak[e] reference to the fact that the suspect had received and waived them earlier."
Id.
ro8. Id. at 377-89. Although confessions may take a narrative form, Inbau et al. recommend a
question-and-answer format in the presence of a stenographer. Id. at 377-78. In this format, the
interrogator should ask the confessor, early in the confession, "a question that will call for an
acknowledgement that he committed the crime." Id. at 379. Doing so is designed to enhance the
"psychological effect on the jury when the written confession is read"; indeed, say the authors, "[e]arly
acknowledgment of guilt in a confession will serve to arouse immediate interest in the document by
the jury as it is read." Id.
1o9. Id. at 389-91. Interrogators should, say the authors, preserve (i) stenographic notes, (2) notes
about the conditions under which the oral and written confessions were obtained, and (3) photographs
or medical examinations of the suspect. Id. at 389-90.
110. Id. at 391-93. Given the willingness of suspects to discuss the reasons why they confessed,
Inbau et al. suggest that a post-confession interview may present "an excellent opportunity for an
investigator to improve upon his knowledge and skill." Id. at 391.
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A. WHO AUTHORED THE REID TECHNIQUE?
The most recent edition of Criminal Interrogation and Confessions
credits four different authors: Fred E. Inbau, John E. Reid, Joseph P.
Buckley, and Brian C. Jayne."' Given that Buckley and Jayne arrived on
the historical scene well after the Reid method's original creation,"2
uncovering the genesis of the Reid method requires focusing almost
exclusively on its original creators: Fred E. Inbau and John E. Reid,
respectively." 3 This brief section therefore offers a primer on their
backgrounds.
i. Fred E. Inbau
Fred Edward Inbau was born on March 27, 1909, in New Orleans,
Louisiana, and received his B.S. from Tulane University in 1930."4 After
hearing from his father, a struggling shipyard worker, that lawyers make
a significant amount of money,"' Inbau attended Tulane Law School
where he served as Editor-in-Chief of the Tulane Law Review and
earned his LL.B. in 1932.-6 Inbau then attended Northwestern University
School of Law where he received his LL.M., and began a lengthy
professional relationship with the School of Law."7
iI i. There is little information about the background of each author and, as a result, this section
cobbles together the meager biographical information available for each individual by relying, in large
part, on their scholarship.
112. Brian C. Jayne began working at John E. Reid and Associates in 1978. Fairfax County
Criminal Justice Academy Biographies, Brian C. Jayne (unpublished document, on file with the
Hastings Law Journal). He graduated with a B.S. in Criminal Justice from the University of
Wisconsin-Platteville and received a "Master of Science in Detection of Deception" from the Reid
College. Id. He also served as the Dean of Reid College from 1983 to 1988. Id. A few perhaps obvious
points about Jayne's background bear mention. First, there is no accredited college known as "Reid
College." See U.S. Dep't of Educ., Database of Accredited Postsecondary Institutions and Programs,
http://ope.ed.gov/accreditation/Search.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2010) (search "Reid" under "Name of
Institution"; no relevant results are produced). Second, this Author is aware of no graduate school that
awards a Master of Science degree in "detecting deception."
Joseph P. Buckley is currently the president of John E. Reid & Associates. He received his
B.A. from Loyola University Chicago and he too holds a "Master of Science in Detection of
Deception" from the Reid College. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SECURITY MANAGEMENT: TECHNIQUES AND
TECHNOLOGY, at xvi (John J. Fay ed., 2d ed. 2007).
113. Naming the popular interrogation method as "the Reid technique" is somewhat ironic given
that it was Inbau who first developed the underlying interrogation techniques, see INBAU, supra note 6,
whereas Reid's professional work focused almost exclusively on developing the polygraph method, see
infra note 142 (providing list of Reid's publications about the polygraph method for lie detection).
Perhaps the irony is better illustrated by the fact that it was Inbau who first coined the phrase "Reid
technique," and did so in reference to Reid's approach to polygraph examinations. See FRED E. INBAU,
LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 14 n.21 (2d ed. 1948).
114. Inbau Papers, supra note 24.
115. AELE Law Enforcement, Fred E. lnbau (1909-1998), http://www.aele.org/Inbau.html (last
visited Jan. 12, 2010).




In 1933, Inbau began working as a research assistant in the Scientific
Crime Detection Laboratory, a permanent laboratory then associated
with Northwestern University School of Law."' The lab focused on
examining and preserving criminal evidence through media like
photography and chemical analysis." 9 It also offered practical experience
in things like identifying firearms, conducting polygraph tests, and
detecting forgeries.'20 Inbau's position thereafter became a joint one,
requiring him to teach in the School of Law and to work in the lab.' 2'
Inbau met John E. Reid in 1940 when Reid joined the lab that same
year.'22 Although the School of Law sold the lab in 1938, Inbau continued
working there as its Director until 1941.123
From 1941 to 1945, Inbau returned to private practice as a trial
attorney until he rejoined Northwestern University School of Law as a
full-time professor of law. 24 Inbau spent the balance of his career at the
School of Law where, among other things, he established continuing
legal education courses both for prosecuting and defense attorneys. 2 5 He
also served as president of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences,
worked as an editor for and published in the Journal of Criminal Law,
Criminology and Police Science, 126 and established a nonprofit
organization called Americans for Effective Law Enforcement.127
18. Id.; see also Thomas, supra note 5 ("The laboratory was established in 1929 after the St.
Valentine's Day Massacre to give the police an edge in the fight against organized crime.").
i19. Inbau Papers, supra note 24.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2.
123. Id. at i.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2. The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science ran from 1951 to 1972
and served to continue the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (193 1-1951). See Editorial, 42 J.
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Scl. I (1951) (recognizing the Journal's 1951 name change). The 1931
to 1951 version of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, in turn, continued Dean Henry
Wigmore's original Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology (1910-1931).
See Editorials, Announcement, 22 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1931) (recognizing the
Journal's 1931 name change). A 1973 change divided the Journal into The Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology (1973-present) and a new periodical called the Journal of Police Science and
Administration. See Editorial, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY I (1973). Northwestern published all
iterations of the Journal, regardless of timeframe. To avoid confusion, the text of this Article treats all
versions of the Journal as though they were published in the Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology.
127. AELE Law Enforcement, Fred E. Inbau (1909-1998), supra note 115. Inbau established the
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement (AELE) in order to counteract the Supreme Court's 1966
decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), by filing amicus curiae briefs in Supreme Court
cases involving restrictions on police actions. See Inbau Papers, supra note 24, at 2.
Inbau also served as an officer and director of the Chicago Crime Commission and president of
the Illinois Academy of Criminology (1951-1952) and of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences
(t955-1956). Id. And, in addition to his founding of AELE, Inbau founded the Business Integrity
Institute in order to lobby against laws restricting employers' ability to terminate employees at will. Id.
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Inbau's work earned him credit for replacing the "third degree"
method of interrogation in the early 19oos with "an approach to
interrogation that relied on presenting a mass of damaging facts to
persuade criminals that they had no choice but to confess, and that used
subtle psychology in dealing with crimes of passion."128 No matter the
crime, though, Inbau's interrogation methods relied on sympathy for the
criminal, trickery, deception, and sometimes outright lies.' 9 To
determine which of his methods was most effective, Inbau often
interviewed prisoners after their conviction.'30
Inbau shared his expertise through his work as a prolific scholar
both during his tenure at the School of Law and after his retirement from
it in 1977."' His impressive resume of publications includes more than
forty-five journal articles and eighteen books,' 32 the first of which was Lie
Detection and Criminal Interrogation in I942.'3 And, as his friendship
with Reid grew, the pair began working together and collaborated on
several texts, including Truth and Deception: The Polygraph ("Lie-
Detector") Technique 34 and, most notably for the purposes of this
Article, the multiple, influential editions of Criminal Interrogations and
Confessions.'35 Inbau died in May of 1998 from injuries he sustained in a
traffic accident.' 6
2. John E. Reid
Materials providing biographical information for John E. Reid are
scarce, to say the least. He was born on August 16, 19io, and obtained a
law degree from DePaul University.'37 He joined the Chicago Police
Department in 1936 and later accepted a position in the Chicago Police
Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory where, as noted, he met Fred
128. Thomas, supra note 5.
129. Id. Inbau was considered a "master" at using his own techniques:
When questioning a man suspected of killing his wife, for example, Mr. Inbau would
feign such sympathy for the hapless man's plight, sometimes shedding real tears, and
showing such contempt for the bullying wife who had driven him to the deed that by the




131. Marvin E. Wolfgang, Commemorative Note on Professor Fred Inbau, 68 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 176, 176 (1977) (commemorating Inbau's retirement).
132. See Thomas, supra note 5; Biographical Sketch -Fred E. Inbau, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY,
at ix-xi (1977) (appearing in the Table of Contents).
133. INBAU, supra note 6.
134. JOHN E. REID & FRED E. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION: THE POLYGRAPH ("LIE-DETECTOR")
TECHNIQUE (1966).
135. Supru note 132.
136. Note from the Editors. Tribute to Fred E. Inbau, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1269, 1269
(1999) (noting the date of death); INBAU ET AL., supra note 3, at ix (noting the cause of death).
137. JOHN E. REID & Assocs., INC., SEMINAR SCHEDULE & PRODUCT CATALOG 2 (2009).
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Inbau.138 He was trained at the lab as a polygraph examiner and remained
there until 1947 when he left to begin his own company, John E. Reid &
Associates.'3
Reid thereafter dedicated his professional life to the polygraph
examination. 40 He testified as a polygraph expert in numerous cases
nationwide.'4 And, as discussed in detail below, Reid also published
several articles in Inbau's Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,'42 as
well as coauthoring numerous texts with him. 43 Of particular interest, of
course, he coauthored with Inbau the 1953 edition of Lie Detection and
Criminal Interrogation, and the 1962, 1967, and 1986 editions of Criminal
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171, 178 (Mich. 1977) (noting that Reid had been involved
with the polygraph for over thirty years).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Penick, 496 F.2d 1105, 1109 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Zeiger,
350 F. Supp. 685, 689 (D.D.C. 1972); United States v. Lanza, 356 F. Supp. 27, 31 (M.D. Fla. 1972);
Barbara, 255 N.W.2d at 178; see also People v. Styles, 220 N.E.2d 885, 887 (111. App. Ct. 1966) (noting
Reid's testimony reporting the results of his interrogation of defendant).
142. See, e.g., Frank S. Horvath & John E. Reid, The Polygraph Silent Answer Test, 63 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScI. 285 (1972) [hereinafter Horvath & Reid, Polygraph Silent Answer Test],
Frank S. Horvath & John E. Reid, The Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diagnosis of Truth and
Deception, 62 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 276 (1971) [hereinafter Horvath & Reid,
Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diagnosis]; George W. Harman & John E. Reid, The Selection and
Phrasing of Lie-Detector Test Control Questions, 46 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 578 (1955)
[hereinafter Warman & Reid, Selection and Phrasing of Lie-Detector Questions]; Richard 0. Arther &
John E. Reid, Utilizing the Lie Detector Technique to Determine the Truth in Disputed Paternity Cases,
45 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SC. 213 (1954) [hereinafter Arther & Reid, Lie Detector in
Paternity Cases]; John E. Reid & Richard 0. Arther, Behavior Symptoms of Lie-Detector Subjects, 44
J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 104 (1953) [hereinafter Reid & Arther, Behavior Symptoms];
John E. Reid, A Revised Questioning Technique in Lie-Detection Tests, 37 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
542 (1947) [hereinafter Reid, Revised Questioning Technique]; John E. Reid, Simulated Blood Pressure
Responses in Lie-Detector Tests and a Method for Their Detection, 36 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 201
(1945) [hereinafter Reid, Simulated Blood Pressure Responses]; John E. Reid, Police Science Legal
Abstracts and Notes, 34 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 69 (1943) [hereinafter Reid, Police Science '943];
John E. Reid, Police Science Legal Abstracts and Notes, 33 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 97 (1942)
[hereinafter Reid, Police Science 1942]; John E. Reid, Police Science Legal Abstracts and Notes, 32 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 259 (1941) [hereinafter Reid, Police Science 194r]. Reid also published a
handful of articles in other journals. See, e.g., Fred E. Inbau & John E. Reid, The Lie-Detector
Technique: A Reliable and Valuable Investigative Aid, So A.B.A. J. 470 (1964) [hereinafter Inbau &
Reid, Lie-Detector Technique: Reliable and Valuable]; John E. Reid, The Lie Detector in Court, 4
DEPAUL L. REV. 31 (1954); John E. Reid, The Lie-Detector, I5 INS. COUNS. J. 85 (1948).
143. See, e.g., INBAU ET AL., supra note 3; FRED E. INBAU, JOHN E. REID & JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS, at v (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter INBAU, REID & BUCKLEY,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 3D ED.] (Although he died in 1982, Reid participated in authoring some of
the manuscript for this third edition.); JOHN E. REID & FRED E. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION: THE
POLYGRAPH ("LIE-DETECTOR") TECHNIQUE (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter REID & INBAU, TRUTH AND
DECEFION 2D ED.] FRED E. INBAU & JOHN B. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (ad ed.
1967) [hereinafter INBAU & REID. CRIMINAL INTERROGATION an ED.]; REID & INBAU, supra note 134;
INBAU & REID, supra note ao; FRED B. INBAU & JOHN B. REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL




Interrogation and Confessions.'" Reid died from cardiovascular illness on
January I i, 1982.145
B. How WERE Two LAWYERS ABLE TO CREATE LEGITIMATE
INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES PREMISED ON PSYCHOLOGY? (HINT: THEY
WERE NOT)
For an impressive and astonishing sixty-seven years, the work of two
individuals with merely law degrees has entered nearly every
interrogation room.''' But how did they do it? How did Reid and
Inbau-neither of whom had a background in psychology-become the
two most noted resources for establishing psychological methods for
obtaining confessions? To answer these questions, this section examines
salient portions of their scholarship in detail while periodically
considering the social climate at the time of publication.
As with all great stories, it began with good timing. At the time
Inbau published his first text on interrogation in 1942, law enforcement's
use of the "third degree" had grown so unpopular that nobody bothered
to ask whether Inbau could authoritatively introduce psychology into the
interrogation room.' 47 Before that text, interrogators relied on harsh
physically abusive tactics to obtain confessions and even the Supreme
Court struggled to evaluate their validity. How did the Court struggle
and why did it need Fred Inbau, you ask? Let us briefly digress to find
the answers.
The Supreme Court has long recognized- since 1884, to be exact-
that "[a] confession, if freely and voluntarily made, is evidence of the
most satisfactory character."'48 At first, the requirement that a confession
be made voluntarily was construed narrowly as merely a common-law
evidentiary requirement having no relationship to the Constitution. 49
Yet, in that context, an involuntary confession was one induced by a
"threat or promise by or in the presence of such person, which, operating
upon the fears or hopes of the accused, in reference to the charge,
deprives him of that freedom of will or self-control essential to make his
confession voluntary within the meaning of the law."' 50 The Court
144. See supra note 143 (providing list of coauthored titles).
145. INBAu, REID & BUCKLEY, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 3D ED., supra note 143.
146. See generally Weisselberg. supra note 22, at 1537 ("Whether or not the surveyed officers
recognized the Reid name, they employed many of the same techniques.").
147. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940); see also Leo, supra note 4, at 8o ("What is
sociologically significant about the interrogation training manuals and seminars is not that they are
founded on pseudo-scientific knowledge, but rather that Inbau, Reid and others have articulated and
disseminated a professional ideology of interrogation that has sought to confer legitimacy on
controversial police practices by invoking the cultural authority of modern science and technology.").
£48. Hopt v. Utah, no0 U.S. 574, 584 (1884).
149. Id. at 584-85.
x50. Id. at 585
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subsequently applied this early voluntariness rule to a number of cases in
which the defendant was in custody, yet received no warnings about
silence or counsel.15'
Thirteen years later, in Bram v. United States, the Court merged its
common law voluntariness rule into the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.' The "generic" language of the Fifth
Amendment, the Court reasoned, "was but a crystallization of the
doctrine as to confessions."'53  Although, after Bram, involuntary
confessions were inadmissible in federal criminal trials as a matter of
constitutional law, the Fifth Amendment was not yet considered a
fundamental right applicable to the states.154 States were therefore free to
ignore the Bram voluntariness requirement.
For roughly three decades thereafter, federal courts faithfully
applied Bram,'55 a proposition aided by the Supreme Court's extension of
Bram in Ziang Sung Wan v. United States." In Wan, an ill defendant
confessed after enduring almost two weeks of relentless, incommunicado
police interrogation."' Although the defendant's resulting confession was
motivated neither by threat nor promise, the Court nonetheless held that
"a confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded whatever may
have been the character of the compulsion, and whether the compulsion
was applied in a judicial proceeding or otherwise."'58
Notwithstanding the extension of Bram in Wan, there remained no
constitutional basis for excluding a defendant's confession in state court
until 1936.'15 In Brown v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court-adhering to
principles of federalism' -held that due process mandated invalidating
a confession obtained by "officers of the State [using] brutality and
151. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 624 (1896); Pierce v. United States, 16o U.S.
355,357 (1896); Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 55 (1895).
152. 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897).
153. Id. at 543.
154. See infra note 16o (discussing incorporation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment).
155. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 32 F.2d 86o, 863 (9th Cir. 1929); Purpura v. United States, 262
F. 473, 476 (4th Cir. 1919); Sorenson v. United States, 143 F. 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1906).
156. 266 U.S. 1 (1924).
157. Id. at 10-14.
158. Id. at 14-15.
159. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 279 (1936). This was of course of particular
significance given that the Court had yet to hold that the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
applied to the states.
16o. Given the holding in Bram, it would seem reasonable for the Court to ground its holding in
the Fifth Amendment. Yet, at that time, the Court had previously held on several occasions that the
Fifth Amendment did not apply to the states. See, e.g., Adamson v. California 332 U.S. 46, 50-51
(1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 322 (1937); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 98 (1908).
That precedent was, however, overruled in 1964 by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, II (1964), when the
Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporated" the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
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violence."' 6' Specifically, in Brown, officers (with the aid of an angry
mob) hanged one and severely whipped three "ignorant negroes" until
the trio confessed to committing a murder.6' After analogizing the state's
conduct to "the rack and torture chamber,"'" the Court had little trouble
concluding that "[i]t would be difficult to conceive of methods more
revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to procure the
confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the confessions thus
obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of
due process." 6 4
What remained missing after Brown, however, was any meaningful
insight into how to distinguish a voluntary confession from an
involuntary one. Indeed, given that the facts in Brown so clearly
mandated discarding the defendants' confessions, the Court had no
occasion to offer any guidance to courts in future, closer cases. Yet,
before leaving Brown, it is worth pausing to highlight what would grow
into a thematic concern of the Supreme Court: the conduct of police
during interrogation and, more specifically, the use of violence in the
interrogation room to procure a confession.'
The litany of post-Brown confession cases decided by the Court in
166the 1940s,6 particularly those evaluating the propriety of state
confessions, was arguably spurred on by the 1931 Report on Lawlessness
in Law Enforcement, otherwise known as "the Wickersham Report."'
The Wickersham Report exposed the use of "third degree" tactics (i.e.,
the use of physical or mental pain to extract a confession or statement
from a suspect). 68 The report specifically documented, among other
techniques, the use of hot lights, beating suspects with fists or phone
books, and confinement in putrid rooms.' It likewise expressed concern
161. 297 U.S. at 279, 286. Interestingly, Brown was one of many confession decisions issued by the
Supreme Court between the 1930s and 1940s disapproving of conduct by southern white interrogators
questioning African American defendants. See, e.g., Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942); Vernon
v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 547, 547 (194) (mem.); Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544, 544 ('94') (mem.); Canty
v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629,629 (1940) (mem.) White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530. 532-33 (194o): Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238-42 (1940).
162. 297 U.S. at 281-83.
163. Id. at 285-86.
164. Id. at 286.
165. See, e.g., Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. I, II (1924) (describing the government's
interrogation as "severe" and "excruciating"); Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532. 544 (1897)
(reaffirming concern about police "temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be
timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions" (quoting
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896))).
166. See e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944);
Vernon, 313 U.S. 547; Lomax, 313 U.S. 544; Canty, 309 U.S. 629; White, 309 U.S. 631; Chambers, 309
U.S. 227.
£67. See WICKERSHAM REPORT, Suipra InOte 4.
i68. Id. at 19.
£69. Id. at 31, 47, 126, '49.
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over the use of psychologically coercive tactics like prolonged
questioning in isolation without providing food or sleep to the suspect.o70
Although the Court would refer to the Wickersham Report in
several subsequent cases,'7' it first did so in Chambers v. Florida.'72
Relying on Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, the Court invalidated
state confessions taken in 1933 from four young African American
defendants convicted of murdering an elderly white man."' The Court
again relied on the Report when echoing its condemnation of the "third
degree" interrogation tactics in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, wherein the Court
invalidated, on the basis of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process,
uncorroborated 1941 state confessions taken from two suspects convicted
of murder. 7 4
When it became clear that "third degree" interrogation tactics
would no longer be tolerated, police began exerting psychological
pressures on the suspect."' Enter Fred Inbau and his influential 1942
publication, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation.16 He divided the
book into two parts: the first on the polygraph and the other on methods
for-and law governing'-7 7 -criminal interrogations.'17 In the first part,
focusing on the polygraph, Inbau outlined, inter alia, the device's
history 79 and its utility,so and contends that it in no way represents a
continuation of "third degree" practices."' Ironically, Inbau also opined
170. Id. at 18, 191-205.
171. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 & f-5 (1966); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367
U.S. 568, 572-76 ('96'); Haley, 332 U.S. at 605-o6 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Stein v. New York,
346 U.S. 156, 201-02 & n.* (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at i5o nn.5-6, 152
n.8.
172. 309 U.S. 227, 238 n.i i (1940).
173. Id. at 238-42.
174. 322 U.S. at 154. The petitioners in Ashcraft were questioned in secret for thirty-six straight
hours, after which petitioner Ashcraft gave an equivocal confession that he refused to sign once police
transcribed it. Id. at 151-54.
175. Miranda, 384 U.S.at 445-48 (reviewing the history of interrogation techniques and
emphasizing, post-Chambers, that "the modem practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically
rather than physically oriented").
176. INBAU, supra note 6.
177. The section on the law would draw Professor Kamisar's ire two decades later for its
incompleteness. See Yale Kamisar, What Is an "Involuntary" Confession? Some Comments on Inbau
and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERs L. REV. 728, 735 (1963) (commenting
on the 1953 edition's law section and noting "that anyone who attempts to set forth and analyze 'the
law' on these subjects in 62 pages-which is all the space the authors take-strives for the near
impossible").
178. INBAU, supra note 6, at vii. Notably, Inbau also pauses to thank Reid in the preface. Id. at vi
("For their valuable comments on the manuscript, I am indebted to ... John E. Reid.").
179. Id. at 2-4.
180. Id. at 54-58.
18'. Id. at 68 ("The temporary discomfort produced by the blood pressure cuff is too slight to
warrant objection, and the test procedure is of such a nature that it is extremely improbable that it
would encourage or compel a person to confess to a crime which he did not commit.").
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on what credentials a polygraph examiner should possess.' Although
strongly arguing for the polygraph's utility, Inbau conceded that "a
period of skillful interrogation after the completion of the [polygraph]
tests is usually required before a confession is forthcoming."'
In the section on interrogation, Inbau outlined nineteen
184interrogation tactics-premised only on his criminal case experiences -
and assigned a letter of the alphabet to each tactic.'8' Although otherwise
relatively unorganized, Inbau recommended using techniques A through
I on "emotional offenders"' 86 and techniques J through N on "non-
emotional offenders."' Notably, none of the proffered techniques-
many of which are still taught unchanged today'.-recommended that
police rely on physical violence to obtain a confession.t
For emotional offenders-i.e., those whose offenses produce in
them a feeling of remorse-Inbau recommended the following
techniques: (A) display an air of confidence in the subject's guilt; (B)
point out the circumstantial evidence indicative of guilt; (C) call attention
to the subject's physiological and psychological "symptoms" of guilt; (D)
sympathize with the subject by telling him that anyone else under similar
conditions or circumstances might have committed a similar offense; (E)
reduce a subject's guilt feeling by minimizing the moral seriousness of his
offense; (F) sympathize with the subject by condemning his victim, or his
accomplice, or anyone else upon whom some degree of responsibility
might conceivably be placed for the commission of the crime in question;
(G) express friendship in urging the subject to tell the truth; (H) indicate
to the subject, as a reason for telling the truth, the possibility of
exaggeration on the part of his accusers; and (I) rather than seek a
general admission of guilt, first ask the subject a question as to some
detail pertaining to the offense.'90
For nonemotional offenders-i.e., those who experience little or no
feeling of remorse-Inbau recommended these techniques: (J) point out
the futility of resistance; (K) appeal to the subject's pride by well-
selected flattery, or by a challenge to his honor; (L) point out to the
182. Id. at 58-59. According to Inbau, a polygraph operator "should have a fair understanding of
psychology and physiology-and preferably an extensive knowledge of each-but it is not necessary
that he be either a physician or an expert psychologist." Id. at 58.
183. Id.
184. Id. at vi ("It was upon the basis of the actual criminal case experiences of the writer and his
former colleagues that these various tactics and techniques were formulated.").
i85. Id. at 81-i18.
j86. Id. at 8o.
187. Id. at 97.
88. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
189. Leo. supra note 4. at 63 ("[Reid and lnbau's] seemingly well-intentioned training materials
appear to be at least partially responsible for the decline of third degree practices by American police
in the 1940s and 1950s.").
190. INBAU, Supra Inote 6, at 8i-95.
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subject the grave consequences and futility of a continuation of his
offensive behavior; (M) where unsuccessful in obtaining a confession to
the offense in question, seek an admission about some other minor
offense; and (N) play one co-offender against the other when possible.' 9'
Finally, Inbau recommended five additional interrogation
techniques for emotional and nonemotional offenders alike when guilt is
uncertain: (0) ask the subject if he knows why he is being questioned;
(P) obtain from the subject detailed information about his whereabouts
before, during, and after the crime; (Q) ask the subject to relate all he
knows about the offense, the victim, and other possible suspects; (R)
where certain facts are known that suggest the subject's guilt, ask him
about them casually and as though the real facts were not already known;
and (S) at various intervals ask the subject certain pertinent questions as
though the interrogator already knows the correct answers.' Given how
many of these techniques appear in the current 2001 edition of Criminal
Interrogation & Confessions,'93 it is remarkable how little has changed in
the approach to interrogation tactics since 1942.
In any event, after successfully quenching the judiciary's thirst for
new interrogation methods by publishing Lie Detection and Criminal
Interrogation in 1942,'9 Inbau rejoined Northwestern School of Law as a
faculty member in 1945.'95 Having Inbau at Northwestern likely helped
Reid to establish his own research on the polygraph. As Inbau grew
fascinated with, and became persuaded by, Reid's polygraph work,"96
191. Id. at 97-104.
192. Id. at o4-i8.
193. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
194. Leo, supra note 4, at 63. ("[Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation] was a reformist
document, representing a kind of dialectical synthesis between the polarities of third degree violence
and civil liberties for protection of human dignity: Such a synthesis would have been progressive in the
1930s." (alteration in original) (quoting Jerome H. Skolnick, Deception by Police,I CRIM. JUST. ETHICS
40, 47 (1982))).
195. Biographical Sketch-Fred E. Inbau, supra note 132.
196. INBAu & REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 3D ED., supra note 143, at vii. In
the preface to the third edition of Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation, Inbau credits Reid with
developing a new "control question" lie-detector test procedure. Id. Based on this new
"development," Inbau "invited [his] good friend and former colleague, John E. Reid, to join [Inbau] as
coauthor, for it was his research and experimentation that effected this advancement in the lie-
detector technique." Id.
Significantly, the control question technique is hardly foreign to most polygraph examiners.
See Shauna Fleming Askins, United States v. Scheffer: An Anomaly in the Military or a Return to the
Per Se Ban on Polygraph Evidence?, 37 Hous. L. REV. '75, 181 (2000) ("The Control-Question Test
(CQT) is the most commonly administered polygraph test."). Indeed, even the Department of
Defense has relied on the technique. See Mark D. Maxwell et al., Recent Developments Concerning the
Constitutionality of Military Rule of Evidence 707, ARMY L., Dec. 1994, at 13, 14. Briefly stated, the
control question technique involves the following procedure:
This technique involves the formulation of ten to twelve questions to elicit "yes" or "no"
responses. In a [control question] polygraph, examiners ask irrelevant, relevant, and control
questions. Irrelevant questions obtain a subject's normal truthful reactions and chart
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Reid's research gradually began to emerge in the Northwestern
University Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. With a name like
Northwestern attached to Reid's publications and only a J.D. to support
his "scientific" research, only winning the lottery could have offered
Reid better luck.
Reid's work on the Journal began slowly when, from 1942 to 1944,
he wrote annual legal abstracts that summarized various evidentiary
issues.'9 Then, in 1946-the year after Inbau rejoined Northwestern's
law faculty and became Northwestern's Managing Director of
Journals"'-Reid wrote his first article in the Journal titled Simulated
Blood Pressure Responses in Lie-Detector Tests and a Method for Their
Detection.' In the first footnote-one usually earmarked for the author
to provide his or her credentials""-Reid declined to note his own
credentials and, instead, dutifully thanked Inbau.o' That thirteen-page
article, supported by a mere seven footnotes (several of which were
unaccompanied by citations), 20 2 reported Reid's experiments with a lie-
detection device he created to perceive deceptive responses from
suspects.2' Buried among unsupported claims like "[l]ie-detector tests
have been compared to clinical examinations wherein similar
tracings. Relevant questions concern the matter under investigation. Control questions deal
with "an act of wrongdoing of the same general nature as the one [sic] under investigation."
Id. (quoting Paul C. Giannelli & Edward I. Imwinkelreid, I Sci. EVIDENCE 65, 221 (1993) (quoting
REID & INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION 2D ED., supra note 143, at 28)).
197. Reid, Police Science 1943, supra note 142; Reid, Police Science 1942, supra note 142; Reid,
Police Science 1941, supra note 142. Although Inbau was not yet part of the School of Law faculty, his
role as an Associate Editor on the Journal presumably helped Reid earn these brief placements. See,
e.g., Masthead, 35 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY I (1944) (listing Inbau as an Associate Editor and noting
his professional role as "Counsellor at Law, Chicago"); Masthead, 34 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1
(1943) (same); Masthead, 33 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1942) (same). Inbau would later serve as
Editor-in-Chief for the Journal from 1965 to 1971. Foreword to Biographical Sketch-Fred E. Inbau,
supra note 132. Inbau stepped down from serving as Editor-in-Chief in 1971 so that the Journal could
grow into a student-run publication. See id.; James A. Rahl, Fred E. Inbau: Professorial Fighter of
Crime, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY I75, 175 (977).
198. Masthead, 36 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 2 (1945) (listing Inbau as the "Managing Director of
Journals").
199. Reid, Simulated Blood Pressure Responses, supra note 142.
200. See generally Eugene Volokh, Writing a Student Article, 48 J. LEGAL EDuc. 247, 267 (1998)
(referring to the first footnote as an "author's note").
201. Reid, Simulated Blood Pressure Responses, supra note 142, at 201 n.* ("The writer is indebted
to Professor Fred E. Inbau of Northwestern University . . . .").
202. See generally Richard Delgado, How to Write a Low Review Article, 2o U.S.F. L. REv. 445,451
(1986) ("Essentially, each assertion of law or fact that you make in the body of your article will require
a footnote.").
203. Reid, Simulated Blood Pressure Responses, supra note 142, at 21 & fig.x1 (providing an
illustration of the device). More specifically, Reid was fundamentally concerned with the possibility of
suspects influencing the results of their lie-detector tests by increasing or decreasing their blood
pressure or body movements in response to certain questions. Id. at 208. Reid's new device was
designed to detect and eliminate the assertion of artificial blood pressure responses, thereby increasing
the possibility of accurately determining whether a suspect proffered deceptive responses. Id at 211-14.
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physiological phenomena are recorded," Reid concludes that his new
device would enable examiners to "separat[e] the true patterns of
deception from the fraudulent ones."204 Given that Reid used himself to
conduct the "experiments" in support of his conclusion,2 5 Science
Magazine was likely not eager to solicit his findings for publication.2)
Reid continued his work in the Journal one year later when he
published A Revised Questioning Technique in Lie-Detection Tests.20 ' An
Editor's note at the outset of the article stated the following:
The author of this article, a member of the staff of the Chicago Police
Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory, has had extensive experience in
lie-detection examination of criminal suspects and witnesses. He has
made two noteworthy contributions to the field of scientific lie
detection, the first of which was described in a previous number of this
Journal. See "Simulated Blood Pressure Responses in Lie-Detection
Tests and a Method for Their Detection," 36 (3):2o1 (1945). The
present paper describes Mr. Reid's second and equally important
contribution."o'
Reid correspondingly offered his thanks to Inbau in the article's first
footnote. 2119 In this five-page article, unsupported by a single substantive
footnote,2 0 Reid argues in favor of questioning suspects undergoing
polygraph examination using a "comparative response" method.2 '
Ordinarily, Reid indicates, "[t]he customary lie-detector questioning
technique involves asking a number of pertinent questions along with
several which are irrelevant to the matter under investigation but which
204. Id. at 214.
205. Id. at 203-07. Reid assures the reader "that in these various experiments the writer used his
full power of concentration to simulate guilt reactions without being burdened with the guilt
complexes of an actual criminal suspect." Id. at 207.
206. See Science Magazine: General Information for Authors, http://www.sciencemag.org/about/
authors/prep/genjinfo.dtl#unpublished (last visited Jan. 12, 2010) (outlining article submission
requirements and cautioning, "[c]itations to unpublished data and personal communications cannot be
used to support claims in a published paper"); see also Julie Bosman, Reporters Find Science Journals
Harder to Trust, but Not Easy to Verify, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 2oo6, at ci, available at http://
www.nytimes.cOm/2oo6/02/13/business/media/I3journal.html ("Among the most prestigious science
journals that reporters consult regularly are Nature, Science, The New England Journal of Medicine
and The Journal of the American Medical Association."). Notably, Science Magazine was first
published in 1883 and thus was in circulation at the time of Reid and Inbau's publications. See About
AAAS, History & Archives, http://archives.aaas.org/exhibit/origins4.php (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
207. Reid, Revised Questioning Technique, supra note 142.
208. Id. at 542.
209. Id. at 542 n.- ("The writer gratefully acknowledges the assistance of... Fred E. Inbau,
Professor of Law at Northwestern University. . . for his advice and assistance in the organization and
preparation of this paper. ). Inbau was serving as Managing Director of the Northwestern journals
at the time of Reid's second publication and therefore presumably had at least some role in crafting
the Editor's note quoted in the above text. See Fred E. Inbau, Change in Journal Editorship, 37 J.
CRuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 540, 541 (1947) (noting his role as Managing Director).
210. The article has three footnotes, none of which contain citations to supporting experimental
data. See Reid, Revised Questioning Technique, supra note 142, at 542 n.1I, 546 n.2, 547 fl.3.
211. Id. at 544-45-
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are asked for the purpose of determining the nature of the subject's
reactions to the test situation alone."212 The comparative response
method, however, involves the use of a question "which the examiner
knows or feels reasonably sure the subject will lie about" in order to
"indicate the subject's responsiveness when lying."213
Reid based his contention that "comparative response" questioning
is superior to "conventional" questioning on additional unspecified
"experiments" he performed with his colleagues at the Chicago Police
Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory.214 Apart from the quite apparent
absence of an empirical basis to support Reid's thesis, the formula used
for his emerging prominence is becoming clear: witness the use of an
interesting device (a lie-detector device);2 5 ostensibly improve upon its
use; write articles about those improvements; and make friends with a
prominent law professor in order to publish those articles in his well-
respected legal journal. Although Reid (presumably subconsciously)
would refine that formula in later years, he already had a firm foundation
for his house of cards in 1947.
Reid, of course, was not alone in this endeavor. In 1948, Inbau
published his second iteration of Lie Detection and Criminal
Interrogation.216 That text, like its 1942 predecessor, is divided into two
sections: one on the lie detector technique and the other on criminal
interrogation tactics.1 Although, from a substantive standpoint, little
changed between the two editions, Inbau did reprint both of Reid's
essays on the lie-detector and credited the techniques espoused in them
with providing "several distinct advantages over the procedure
previously used."2' In doing so, Inbau appeared to pass the proverbial
2 12. Id. at 542.
2 13. Id. at 544.
214. Id. at 542, 546-47.
215. Reid, Simulated Blood Pressure Responses, supra note 142, at 202 fig.I (noting Reid's use of a
"modified pre-1939 model of the Keeler Polygraph" during his work at the Chicago Police Scientific
Crime Detection Laboratory).
216. INBAU, supra note 113.
217. Id. at xi (Table of Contents).
218. Id. at 14; see also id. at vii-viii ("I am also greatly indebted to [Reid] for permission to include
in the present publication a reprinting of his excellent article 'Simulated Blood Pressure Responses in
Lie-Detector Tests and a Method for their Detection,' together with portions of his paper on 'A
Revised Questioning Technique in Lie Detection Tests,' both of which contributions originally
appeared in the American Journal of Police Science (incorporated in the Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology)."). Inbau continued to organize his comments on criminal interrogation in something of
a scattershot manner by adhering to the alphabet structure he provided in the first edition. See id. at
107-38. Thus, although the revised text noted, for example, the Supreme Court's decisions in McNabb
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (i943), United States e. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944), and Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944), he continued to provide nineteen interrogation pointers organized




torch to Reid for all things related to "the field of deception detection."2
Indeed, in addition to crediting Reid's approach to polygraph
examination, Inbau also indicated his retirement from the field of
deception detection in 1941-220
Reid's approach to polygraph examination ultimately so influenced
Inbau that Inbau invited Reid to coauthor the third edition of Lie
Detection and Criminal Interrogation, published in 1953."' Like the two
editions before it, the third edition remained separated into two sections:
one addressed the lie-detector technique and the other dealt with
criminal interrogation." In this edition's preface, however, Inbau
indicated that part one-addressing the lie-detector technique-was
wholly the product of Reid's "research and experimentation." 2 3 Other
than discussing a relatively small flurry of Supreme Court confession
cases decided since 1948,"4 part two remained largely unchanged from
the prior two editions.225
Reid continued his push for fame when, in 1954, he coauthored
Behavior Symptoms of Lie-Detector Subjects with Richard 0. Arther and
again published in the Journal.26 Like Reid's prior efforts, this piece was
brief-four pages-and supported only by the authors' assertions.2 27 In it,
the pair reported the results of a five-year "study" -based solely on the
authors' observations228-purporting to reflect what behavioral symptoms
guilty persons exhibit.2 29 Although the authors recognize that no specific
type of behavior "should ever be considered proof of guilt or innocence,"5
the results of their study were nevertheless designed to aid lie-detector
examiners in "consider[ing] the probable significance of a subject's
behavior pattern." 230
219. INBAU, suprafnote 113, at 14.
220. Id.
221. INBAU & REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 3D ED., supra note 143.
222. Id. at xi (Table of Contents).
223. Id. at vii.
224. Id. at 205-07 (discussing Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); Stroble v. California, 343
U.S. 181 (1952); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 844
(1950) (per curiam); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949);
Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948)).
225. Again, part two set forth Inbau's comments about how to effectively interrogate suspects over
the course of nineteen separate points spanning assigned letters from A through S. See INBAU & REID,
LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 3D ED., supra note 143, at 153-85.
226. Reid & Arther, Behavior Symptoms, supra note 142. The addition of Arther to the byline
should have done little to aid Reid in his quest for legitimacy. Arther held a B.S. in Police
Administration and no additional academic credentials other than his pursuing "the study of scientific
lie detection at John E. Reid and Associates for six months." Id. at 04.
227. The article is not accompanied by footnotes or supporting experimental data. See id. at lo4-o8.
228. Id. at 104 ("During this time the behavior reactions and statements of these subjects were





According to the authors, guilty subjects, inter alia (i) "frequently
attempt to postpone the date for their examination," (2) "look[] very
worried and [are] highly nervous," (3) "feel it necessary to explain before
the examination why their responses might mislead the examiner into
believing that they are lying," and (4) "sometimes claim that the
apparatus is causing them physical pain." 3' The study also showed,
according to Reid and Arther, that guilty subjects often sought to distort
the results by, for example, wiggling their toes, coughing, or changing
their breathing rate.232
In contrast, innocent subjects often eagerly approached the prospect
of a lie-detector test because they were "usually very glad to be given an
opportunity to prove their innocence."23 Then, during the exam,
"[i]nnocent subjects are often at ease, light-hearted, and talkative." M
From this information, the authors conclude, "[a] definite advantage can
be gained from observing and classifying a subject's behavior
symptoms."235 Although the disturbing absence of empirical support for
the authors' conclusions should have nullified the article's impact, it was
nevertheless reprinted in the third edition of Lie Detection and Criminal
Interrogation.2
Arther and Reid emerged in the Journal yet again just one year
later in 1955, when the pair published Utilizing the Lie Detector
Technique to Determine the Truth in Disputed Paternity Cases.' This
article, like those before it, is brief and is accompanied by little
supporting data.23' The authors argue for the utility of forcing fathers who
disavow paternity to take lie-detector tests.239 Doing so, they contend,
will more efficiently resolve the cases, particularly where the court does
not "have at its disposal the facilities for having blood-grouping tests
made of the complainant, the defendant, and the child."', 0 Even if the
court does have access to such tests, the authors reason, the tests only
231. Id. at 105.
232. Id.
233. Id. at Io6.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 107.
236. INBAU & REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 3D ED., supra note 143. at io6-lo.
237. Arther & Reid, Lie Detector in Paternity Cases, supra note 142.
238. This paper is eight pages and has eight footnotes. In the course of those eight footnotes, the
authors rely on a total of three sources-one of which is the third edition of Lie Detection and
Criminal Interrogation. See id. at 214 n.2, 216 n.5. The article also lacks supporting scientific data. See
id. The authors instead rely on a six-year "study" conducted at John E. Reid & Associates. during
which the authors administered polygraph tests in 312 disputed paternity cases. See id. at 214-15. From
that study, "it was determined that 93 percent of the tested parties lied in some respect when they
testified in court as to their sexual relationship!" Id. at 215.
239. Id. at 219.
240. Id. at 214.
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exclude the individual but cannot identify the father.24' To aid their
assertions, the authors state the following without citation support:
The latest estimation accords to the lie-detector technique, when
properly used, an accuracy of 95%, with a 4% margin of indefinite
(inconclusive) determinations and a i% margin of maximum possible
error. In other words, in the examination of loo subjects the examiner
can make a definite and accurate diagnosis as to the guilt or innocence
of 95 of these subjects. The actual known error at the Reid laboratories
for the past six years was less than .0007.242
Reid's push to legitimize the lie-detector test continued in 1956 with his
coauthored publication-again appearing in the Journal- The Selection
and Phrasing of Lie-Detector Control Questions.243 This time
collaborating with George W. Harman,2" Reid sought in this brief piece
to clarify the utility and corresponding disutility of certain questions used
in his "control question" approach to pre-polygraph examination
interviews. 2 45 The "control question" is one designed "to afford the
examiner a valid means of comparing the subject's responses to the
questions pertaining to the matter under investigation with those induced
241. Id. at 219.
242. Id. at 216 n.5; accord REID & INBAU, supra note 134, at 234 (arguing that the percentage of
known polygraph exam errors is below one percent). But see Paul C. Gianelli, Polygraph Evidence:
Post-Daubert, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 895, 919 (1998) ("This error rate is suspect because it is based on the
assumption that polygraph results are correct unless proven otherwise."). An inordinate number of
studies contradict this (again unsupported) assertion of accuracy. See, e.g., Gordon H. Barland &
David C. Raskin, An Evaluation of Field Techniques in Detection of Deception, 12 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY
321 (1976); Frank Horvath, The Effect of Selected Variables on Interpretation of Polygraph Records, 62
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 127, 130-31 (1977); Benjamin Kleinmuntz & Julian J. Szucko, On the Fallibility of
Lie Detection, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 85, 95-96 (1982) (finding that a leading polygraph firm incorrectly
characterized thirty-nine percent of verified innocent examinees as guilty); see also, e.g., U.S. CONG.
OFFICE OF TECH., ASSESSMENT, SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF POLYGRAPH TESTING: A RESEARCH REVIEW AND
EVALUATION 97 (1983) (noting polygraph studies that showed accuracy rates of approximately sixty
percent); Douglas Carroll, How Accurate Is Polygraph Lie Detection?, in THE POLYGRAPH TEST: LIES,
TRUTH AND SCIENCE 19, 22 (Anthony Gale ed., 1988) (highlighting lab results demonstrating a twenty-
three percent chance that an innocent person will be classified as guilty); Kleinmuntz & Szucko, supra,
at 87 ("[T]here is no reason to believe that lying produces distinctive physiological changes that
characterize it and only it."). The American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs also
analyzed the validity of the polygraph in 1986. See Council Report, Polygraph, 256 JAMA 1172, 1175
(1986). The Council concluded that there existed "enough false-positives and false-negatives to make
many applications [of the polygraph], perhaps even in criminal cases, of dubious value." Id. at 1173.
Even the NCAA's infractions committee is unwilling to utilize polygraphs. See Ed Sherman & Joseph
Tybor, NCAA Skeptical About Polygraphs, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 27, 1990, at iC.
243. Harman & Reid, Selection and Phrasing of Lie-Detector Questions, supra note 142.
244. Like Arther, Reid's prior coauthor, Harman appears underqualified. The article credits
Harman with receiving an undergraduate degree from the University of Pennsylvania and serving for
four years as an officer in the Army Intelligence Corps before receiving lie detection training from
Reid. See id. at 578. He thereafter served as a staff member in Reid's Chicago office before leaving to
become the director of the John E. Reid and Associates' San Francisco Office. See id.
245. The article spans a total of five pages. Id.
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by a question calling for an answer which is a known lie or one which the
examiner may reasonably assume to be untrue."'46
Accompanied, as usual, by few footnotes and little (if any)
supporting experimental data,247 the authors propose explaining the
purpose of the control question to the test subject before asking a
question-the answer to which must always be "no."2' Examiners should
craft a question concerning "a matter of lesser weight than the pertinent
questions" and limit it to "the same general area as the offense for which
the subject is being tested."249 Asking effective control questions,
conclude the authors, will allow the examiner to assess the subject's
behavior symptoms in the context of the pre-polygraph examination
interview before beginning the substantive examination.2 0
Four years later, in 1962, the national media began to notice Reid's
work. That year, parents of a thirteen-year-old child asked Reid to speak
with their boy.2 ' Reid administered a lie-detector test, after which he
elicited an eight-page confession in which the boy admitted to starting a
fire that killed ninety-five people in 1958 at Our Lady of the Angels
School. 252 Reid's work, reported in the Chicago Tribune' and the New
York Times, prompted the Times to characterize him as "a nationally
known expert on lie detectors."2 54
That same year was also a significant scholarship year for both
Inbau and Reid, who published their first edition of Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions.2 " The text no longer divided the lie
detector and interrogation techniques into separate subjects, choosing
instead to focus exclusively on an expanded treatment of interrogation
methods.56 Consistent with their prior writings on interrogation
246. Id. at 578.
247. The article is supported by three footnotes, each of which cites one of Reid's prior
publications. See id. at 578 n.1, 579 n.2, 582 n.3. Of course, the authors also thank Inbau in the author
note. See id. at 578 n.*.
248. Id. at 578-79.
249. Id. at 579. There is no general example of a control question. Instead, the examiner should
create questions tailor-made to the suspect's background. See id (noting the examiner should "select[]
an area of the subject's background from which to draw a tentative control question").
250. Id. at 578 ("The introduction of the control question is best accomplished during the pre-test
interview with the subject, when the examiner is discussing the questions pertaining to the
investigation.").
251. Associated Press, Boy Questioned in Fire: Said to Confess Setting School 1958 Blaze Fatal to




255. INBAU & REID, supra note 20.
256. Id. at ix xii (Table of Contents). The authors elected to focus exclusively on interrogations
because "[ a]n expanded treatment of Criminal Interrogation and Confessions and Lie Detection in one
publication would have resulted in a book that would be too bulky and perhaps too costly for readers
with an interest in only one or the other of the two separate subjects." Id. at vii.
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techniques, this book provides a laundry list of observations-this time
spanning from A to Z.' Included within this iteration are the authors'
familiar suggestions that interropators, inter alia: (i) question suspects in
private and away from home," (2) display an air of confidence in the
suspect's guilt,259 (3) minimize the moral seriousness of the offense by
blaming the victim or society,' and (4) resort to tricking the suspect into
believing there exists more evidence of guilt than the investigators
261possess.
The legal world became intimately familiar with these and other of
Inbau and Reid's interrogation techniques when, in 1966, the Supreme
Court discussed and decried each of them in Miranda v. Arizona.62
Indeed, the totality of techniques promoted by Inbau and Reid prompted
the Supreme Court to conclude that, even in the absence of employing
the "third degree," "the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a
heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of
individuals."263 Backed by an uncharitable view of Reid and Inbau's
interrogation techniques," the Supreme Court held that certain warnings
must be provided to suspects before any custodial interrogation in order
to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.265
257. Id. at ix-x (Table of Contents).
258. Id. at i ("The principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is
privacy-being alone with the person under interrogation.").
259. Id. at 23 ("By an air of confidence we do not mean a supercilious or bullying attitude, but
rather one which will convey to the subject the impression that the interrogator is sure of himself.").
260. Id. at 43.
261. Id. at 28. Equally as consistent with the authors' prior interrogation writings, this expanded
edition relies on no psychological texts to support the assertions contained within. In fact, the text cites
only two books, titled Sexual Behavior in the Human Male and Sexual Behavior in the Human Female,
solely to suggest that interrogators rely on those books when seeking to minimize the moral
seriousness of an individual's suspected conduct in a sex offense case. Id. at 36 n.2. The text otherwise
contains only thirteen footnotes, most of which either offer author observations, or reference legal
doctrines.
262. 384 U.S. 436, 448-55 (1966) (discussing in detail the interrogation techniques outlined by the
first edition of Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions).
263. Id. at 455.
264. See, e.g., id. at 457-58 ("The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with
one of our Nation's most cherished principles-that the individual may not be compelled to
incriminate himself."); Yale Kamisar, The Importance of Being Guilty, 68 J. CluM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
182, 195 (1977) ("The Miranda opinion quotes from or cites the 1953 and 1962 Inbau-Reid manuals no
less than ten times-and never with approval.").
265. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 472. The Court required the now familiar warnings:
[A]n individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to
consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation under the system
for protecting the privilege we delineate today. As with the warnings of the right to remain
silent and that anything stated can be used in evidence against him, this warning is an




Although the Criminal Interrogation and Confession text troubled
the Supreme Court in 1966, it was the polygraph that fascinated the
public two years earlier. In 1964, Reid and Inbau were called to serve as
witnesses in a House Information Subcommittee inquiry into the federal
government's use of lie detectors.266 In response to charges that the lie
detector was "largely bunk," Inbau admitted "lie detector tests were 'not
susceptible to actual statistical analysis"' yet still argued "'a high degree
of accuracy' is attained when tests are properly conducted."6
In any event, Inbau and Reid's cumulative high-profile exposure
clarified one thing: they were famous. The pair took advantage of their
newfound fame by publishing the first edition of their collaborative
work, Truth and Deception: The Polygraph ("Lie-Detector") Technique
in 1966.268 Then, one year later, they responded to the Miranda decision
by publishing the second edition of Criminal Interrogation and
Confessions.269 As to the former, the publication sought again to establish
the validity of Reid's control-question polygraph technique, the same
technique he discussed in so many previous Journal articles. 2 ,o
And, as to the latter, Inbau and Reid specifically sought to
incorporate the warnings required by Miranda into their interrogation
training techniques. 27' Although the pair began the new edition by
promptly admonishing interrogators to provide the rights required by
Miranda at the outset of any custodial interrogation,2 7 2 the techniques
discussed in prior editions-and condemned by the Miranda Court -
changed little in form or substance. Indeed, the 1967 iteration still
counseled interrogators to (i) question suspects in private and away from
home, 274 (2) display an air of confidence in the suspect's guilt,275 (3)
minimize the moral seriousness of the offense by blaming the victim or
society,27' and (4) resort to tricking the suspect into believing there exists
more evidence of guilt than investigators possess. 277 It seems, then, that if
Chief Justice Warren thought his majority opinion in Miranda would
266. Lie Detector Hearings Set, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1964, at Li5.
267. John D. Morris, House Unit Opens Polygraph Study: Rep. Gallagher, Denied Role, Charges a
'Whitewash', N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1964, at 17.
268. REID & INBAU, supra note 134.
269. INBAU & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 2D ED., supra note 143.
270. REID & INBAU, supra note 134, at o-x6; accord supra note 197 and accompanying text.
271. INBAU & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 2D ED., supra note 143, at 4, 125.
272. Id. at 4.
273. See 384 U.S. 436, 448-55 (1966).
274. INBAU & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 2D ED., supra note 143, at 5.
275. Id. at 26.
276. Id. at 47.
277. Id. at 32.
562 [Vol. 61:529
POLICE "SCIENCE"
materially change Inbau and Reid's approach to interrogation, he was
woefully mistaken.78
Meanwhile, Reid continued his effort to bring the polygraph
technique into the mainstream. This time collaborating with colleague
Fred Horvath, 9  the pair published-again in the Journal-The
Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diagnosis of Truth and Deception in
1971.2" Once again brief and characteristically unsupported,"' this paper
ostensibly reported the results of a "study" on whether "[p]olygraph
examiners, working independently of each other, are able to successfull
diagnose deception solely from an analysis of Polygraph records."2,2
According to Horvath and Reid, experienced polygraph examiners
successfully identified deception solely from polygraph results 91.4% of
the time, whereas inexperienced examiners were correct in only 79.1 % of
cases.283 From these numbers, the authors first conclude, "Polygraph
examiners ... can reliably diagnose truth and deception or detect the
guilty and identify the innocent solely from an analysis of Polygraph
278. Amazingly, notwithstanding the absence of any material change in the Reid technique (and
the absence of credentials from its authors), the modern Supreme Court has cited the Manual with
approval at least twice. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 6oo, 61o n.2 (2004) ("It is not the case, of
course, that law enforcement educators en masse are urging that Miranda be honored only in the
breach.") (citing INBAU, REID & BUCKLEY, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 3D ED., supra note 143, at 221);
Stansbury v. California, 5II U.S. 318, 324 (994) ("It is well settled, then, that a police officer's
subjective view that the individual under questioning is a suspect, if undisclosed, does not bear upon
the question whether the individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda.") (citing INBAU, REID &
BUCKLEY, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 3D ED., supra note 143, at 232, 236, 297-98). Those citations are
indeed unfortunate; the website for John E. Reid and Associates currently references the cites and
boasts that the Supreme Court believes the Reid technique exemplifies "proper training." See John E.
Reid & Associates, Inc., Company Information, supra note 2.
279. Frank Horvath graduated from Michigan State University with a B.S. in Police
Administration. Horvath & Reid, Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diagnosis, supra note 142, at 276.
Following his graduation, he undertook "the Study of Scientific Polygraph testing at John E. Reid and
Associates" and became a "Chief Examiner." Id. Horvath's dearth of credentials would later draw the
ire of noted Professor of Psychology, Saul M. Kassin, after Horvath performed a study purportedly
demonstrating that training in the Reid technique produced an eighty-five percent level of accuracy in
detecting deception. Compare Frank Horvath et al., Differentiation of Truthful and Deceptive Criminal
Suspects in Behavior Analysis Interviews, 39 J. FORENSIC Scl. 793 (1994) (evaluating sixty interview
tapes from the Reid interview collection and concluding from the judgments of experienced in-house
staff members that the Reid technique produced accurate results), with Saul M. Kassin, The
Psychology of Confessions, 4 ANN. REV. L. Soc. SCI. 193, 197 (2008) (noting that Horvath's study is
"grossly out of step with basic science").
280. Horvath & Reid, Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diagnosis, supra note 142. As always,
Reid thanked Inbau "for his assistance and suggestions." Id. at 281.
281. The paper is five pages long and supported by five footnotes, two of which rely on prior Reid
publications. Id. at 276-81 nn.4, 5. Moreover, the "data" utilized in this study is self-created. Reid
asked polygraph examiners to analyze polygraph records-generated by Horvath-to assess
deception. Id. at 276-77. Then, Reid or Horvath determined the accuracy of those determinations. Id.
at 277.
282. Id. at 276.
283. Id. at 279.
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records."24 Additionally, say Horvath and Reid, the data reflects the
importance "of practice experience in qualifying examiners as experts."'
Reid's work to establish the polygraph as a mainstream lie detection
device paid off that same year. On November 21, 1971, the New York
Times ran a lengthy front-page article discussing the rising popularity
among employers -public or private-of using the polygraph to weed
out dishonest prospective and current employees.8 In the article, Reid
boasted that his company "get[s] better results than a priest does.""" The
article prominently featured his coauthored polygraph text with Inbau,
Truth and Deception, and referred to it as the "standard text book on the
lie detector."'" Although the article concluded by observing that an
emerging body of studies challenged the accuracy of polygraph test
results, it never explored or commented on Reid's background.
Reid published his final article in the Journal one year later, titled
The Polygraph Silent Answer Test, again with Horvath.t This lightly
cited eight-page paper analyzed the "silent answer test," in which "the
subject is told to listen to each test question and to answer only to
himself silently."290 Given that individuals ordinarily answer questions
aloud when asked, the silent answer test will ideally produce in the
suspect an emotional reaction that will reflect truth or deception on the
polygraph chart.' It should, say the authors, follow the oral test and the
examiner should re-ask the questions in the exact same order.292 If
administered properly, the silent answer test "materially increase[s] the
accuracy of the Polygraph technique." 93
Although Reid's effort again contained no scientific or empirical
support, his work nevertheless progressively gained more credibility in
the media throughout the 1970s for the polygraph's role in (i) the
284. Id. at 281.
285. Id Presumably, the totality of this article is actually a thinly veiled effort to support Inbau and
Reid's long-held belief that blame for any inaccurate results produced by the lie-detector technique
resides with the examiner rather than the machine or method of questioning. See infra note 355 and
accompanying text; see also Morris, supra note 267 (reporting Inbau's comments about the polygraph:
"'a high degree of accuracy' is attained when tests are properly conducted"). In a separate earlier
publication, Reid and Inbau went as far as to suggest that competent polygraph examiners should
received "instruction in the pertinent phases of psychology." See Inbau & Reid, Lie-Detector
Technique: Reliable and Valuable, supra note 142. Those comments are of course ironic when
juxtaposed with Reid and Inbau's own backgrounds.
286. Ben A. Franklin, Lie Detector's Use by Industry Rises; Rights Peril Feared, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
22, 1971, at i.
287. Id. at 45.
288. Id.
289. Horvath & Reid, Polygraph Silent Answer Test, supra note 142.
290. Id. at 285. The paper contains five footnotes, one of which relies on the first edition of Reid's
coauthored Truth and Deception text. See id. at 285-90, 286 nl.2.
29!. Id. at 286.
292. Id. at 287.
293. Id. at 293.
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Watergate scandal,294 (2) discovering who leaked sensitive American
Medical Association documents to reporters,295 and (3) shutting down a
high-profile libel lawsuit filed by James Earl Ray (the convicted killer of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.).296 A second and final edition of Truth and
Deception in 1976 helped further solidify the utility of Reid's approach to
polygraph examinations.2
Although Reid passed away in 1982, he managed to collaborate on a
portion of the 1986 third edition of Criminal Interrogation and
Confessions.295 That edition is, in the words of its authors, "basically an
entirely new book."2 99 The edition adds, revises, and rearranges a number
of earlier published techniques and synthesizes them into "nine steps
toward effective interrogation." 3"" According to coauthors Inbau and
Joseph P. Buckley, "[t]hese developments are due primarily to the skill
and ingenuity of . . . John E. Reid."30' In addition to debuting the new
nine-step interrogation technique, this edition for the first (and only)
time included an appendix-written by someone without a degree in
psychology 2-to elaborate on the psychological principles of criminal
interrogation. 3 o
This final product-in the form of the nine-step Reid technique-
completes the house of cards: authors with no empirical authority
created the technique, it lacks supporting experimental data, and it is not
recognized by the scientific community. Yet, as the current 2001 version
implicitly notes, observations by Reid are evidently the only
prerequisites necessary to create an interrogation training empire: "[a]s a
result of many years of experience, primarily on the part of the staff of
John E. Reid & Associates under the guidance of the late John E. Reid,
294. Christopher Lydon, Colson Reported Passing a Lie Test on Watergate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8,
1973, at i.
295. David Burnham, 4 A.M.A. Employes [sic] Quizzed on Leak: Lie Detector Tests Given to
Discover the Source, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1975, at 13.
296. Associated Press, Ray Files a Libel Suit Against Playboy but Is Told to Withdraw It, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 1977, at 29.
297. REID & INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION 2D ED., supra note 143. Arguably, psychologist David
Lykken's development of the "Guilty Knowledge Test" is one reason that no subsequent editions of
Truth and Deception were published. See Richard H. Underwood, Truth Verifiers: From the Hot Iron
to the Lie Detector, 84 Ky. L.J. 597, 630 (1995). Lykken criticized Reid's control question method,
noting that subjects could beat the control question method by altering their physiological reactions to
control questions. Id. at 630 n.139.




302. Brian C. Jayne is the author credited with drafting the appendix. See id. at 327. As noted, he
does not possess a recognized graduate degree and does not even have an undergraduate degree in
psychology. See supra note 112.
303. INBAU, REID & BUCKLEY, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 3D ED., supra note £43, at 325-47-
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the interrogation process has been formulated into nine structural
components-the nine steps of criminal interrogation."
304
III. WHY CONFESSIONS OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE REID METHOD
ARE INADMISSIBLE
The totality of the discussion of Inbau and Reid's lifelong work in
polygraph and interrogation techniques should unequivocally
demonstrate one thing: all of their "scientific" and "psychological" work
is collectively based on nothing more than the mere observations-rather
than experimental data-of two people who possessed only law
degrees.305 Reid's work focused almost exclusively on revising how to
conduct polygraph testing despite the judiciary's continual and uniform
rejection of polygraph results306 -a rejection that began nearly twenty
years before Reid began his work on the lie-detector technique.3f
Although the foundation of that discredited technique underlies the
modern nine-step Reid technique, police continue to learn it and obtain
confessions by using it. Section A makes the perhaps self-evident
assertion that if the results of a polygraph are inadmissible in court, then
so too should be confessions obtained pursuant to the Reid method.
Section B then separately argues that the Reid method's claimed
basis in psychology requires that it comport with the Supreme Court's
decisions in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.' and Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael. Those decisions provide the test for how to
assess the validity of expert evidence. The Reid technique-premised
exclusively on its creators' observations-utterly fails that test. Section B
therefore argues that all interrogator testimony about confessions
obtained pursuant to the Reid method is inadmissible.
A. POLYGRAPH RESULTS ARE INADMISSIBLE IN COURT; So Too, THEN,
SHOULD BE THE RESULTS OF CONFESSIONS OBTAINED PURSUANT TO
THE REID METHOD
The relationship between the polygraph exam and the courts has
historically been a tumultuous one. The first appellate court to consider
the admissibility of polygraph results was the D.C. Circuit in its 1923 Frye
304. Id. at 212.
305. At least one justice has questioned the validity of the techniques espoused by the Reid
technique on this exact basis. See State v. Jackson, 304 S.E.2d 134, 164 n.r (N.C. 1983) (Exum, J.,
dissenting) ("Although [Criminal Interrogation and Confessions] has a section on the law governing
the admissibility of confessions, the greater part of the book is nothing more than a police manual
suggesting methods of interrogation."), rev'd sub nom. Jackson v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 1077
(1987).
306. See supra note 26.
307. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
308. 509 U.S. 579 ('993).
309. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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v. United States opinion.3"o In Frye, the defendant confessed to murder
but subsequently sought to repudiate his confession.3"' For support, he
offered results from a primitive version of a polygraph test-better
known then as the systolic blood pressure deception test" 2 -which
supported his claim of innocence.313 In rejecting the defendant's proffer,
the Frye court held that results from the systolic blood pressure
deception test were inadmissible given that the test was not sufficiently
recognized in the scientific community.3 14 In doing so, the court outlined
a test that would govern the admissibility of expert scientific evidence for
nearly seven decades: to be admissible, expert scientific evidence "must
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs." 1
Courts nationwide responded to Frye with uniform skepticism of lie
detectors.3,6 The majority of post-Frye courts imposed a per se ban on
polygraph results out of concern that such results were unreliable and,
moreover, could unduly invade the province of the jury as fact-finder.317
A handful of courts, however, admitted polygraph results for limited
purposes or upon stipulation of the parties."8
310. 293 F. 1053.
31. James R. McCall, Misconceptions and Reevaluation-Polygraph Admissibility After Rock and
Daubert, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 363, 366 n.13.
312. Frye, 293 F. at 503. The systolic blood pressure test, in the court's words, was premised on
the notion
that conscious deception or falsehood, concealment of facts, or guilt of crime, accompanied
by fear of detection when the person is under examination, raises the systolic blood pressure
in a curve, which corresponds exactly to the struggle going on in the subject's mind, between
fear and attempted control of that fear, as the examination touches the vital points in
respect of which he is attempting to deceive the examiner.
Id. at 103-14.
313. McCall, supra note 311
314. 293 F. at 014.
315. Id.
316. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312 n.7 (1998) ("Until quite recently, federal and
state courts were uniform in categorically ruling polygraph evidence inadmissible under the [Frye]
test. . . .").
317. See, e.g., People v. Baynes, 430 N.E.2d 5070, 5079 (Ill. 5985) ("Polygraph evidence is not
reliable enough to be admitted."); Morgan v. Commonwealth, 809 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Ky. 5995) ("The
results of polygraph examinations are unreliable and are therefore inadmissible in evidence."); People
v. Leone, 255 N.E.2d 696, 700 (N.Y. 1969) (concluding that reliability of the polygraph was unproven);
Fulton v. State, 541 P.2d 871, 872 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) (commenting on "the potential unreliability
of polygraph examinations"); Commonwealth ex rel Riccio v. Dilworth, 115 A.2d 865, 867 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1955) ("The reliability and scientific infallibility of the polygraph.., must be more definitely
established before our courts will accept their results as credible."); Lee v. Commonwealth, so5 S.E.2d
552, 555 (Va. 5958) ("[Polygraph] tests generally have not as yet been proved scientifically
reliable. .. )
358. Timothy B. Henseler, A Critical Look at the Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in the Wake
of Daubert: The Lie Detector Fails the Test, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 5247, 5248 &C nn.7-8 (5997).
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In 1993, the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.319 altered the standards governing the admissibility
of expert scientific testimony. In Daubert, the Court concluded that the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence-Rules 403, 703, and
especially 7023 2 -supplanted the Frye test.3 ' In an effort to assist federal
courts in applying Rule 702, the Supreme Court advised courts to
consider the following nonexhaustive list of analytical factors: (i)
"whether [the proposed scientific knowledge] can be (and has been)
tested," (2) "whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer
review and publication," (3) "the known or potential rate of error," and
(4) whether the science has achieved "general acceptance" in the
relevant scientific community.3 22
The Supreme Court's decision in Daubert was of course binding
only on federal courts; state courts remained free to continue utilizing
the Frye test.323 Regardless of whether jurisdictions applied Daubert or
319. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
320. Id. at 594-95 (noting that in addition to complying with Rule 702, judges must "be mindful of
other applicable rules"). Then-applicable Rule 702, addressing the admissibility of scientific evidence,
provided: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
FED. R. EVID. 702 (1993). The current version of Rule 702 largely incorporates Daubert's factors:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise, if (x) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
321. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587 (agreeing with petitioners' contention that "the Frye test was
superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence").
322. Id. at 593-94.
323. See, e.g., State v. Harrod, 26 P.3d 492, 5oo n.7 (Ariz. 2004) ("We have long held [polygraph
evidence] to be inadmissible under the Frye standard."), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Harrod v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 953 (2oo2); People v. Wilkinson, 94 P-3d 551, 565 (Cal. 2004) (relying on state
legislative ban on polygraph evidence); People v. Lyons, 907 P.2d 7o8, 712 (Colo. App. 1995)
(observing that Daubert interpreted only the Federal Constitution and reaffirming Colorado's per se
ban on polygraph evidence); State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 745 (Conn. 1997) ("Because Daubert was
premised on an interpretation of a federal rule of evidence, its rejection of Frye is not binding
authority on state courts."); State v. Trevino, 980 P.2d 552, 557 (Idaho 1999) (rejecting defendant's
claim that Daubert requires a hearing on polygraph admissibility); State v. Shively, 999 P.2d 952, 955
(Kan. 2000) ("The general acceptance test of Frye governs the admissibility of expert scientific
evidence in Kansas in those situations wherein such a test or standard is required."): see also, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Duguay, 720 N.E.2d 458 (Mass. 1999); Humphrey v. State, 759 So. 2d 368 (Miss.
2000); People v. Franks, 761 N.Y.S.2d 459 (2003); Paxton v. State, 867 P.2d 1309 (Okla. Crim. App.
1993); State v. Werner, 851 A.2d 10o93 (R.I. 2004); State v. Council, 51 S.E.2d 508 (S.C. 1999); Ross v.
State, 433 S.W.3d 6i8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Wright v. State, 454 SMW/3d 235 (Tex. App. 2005); State
v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997); State v. Beard, 464 S.E.2d 486 (W. Va. 4995); State v. Steven G.
B., No. 93 -1658-CR, 1996 Wisc. App. LEXIS 4o32 (Ct. App. July 34, 1996).
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Frye, though, the consensus among many was that Daubert's logic might
allow courts to reconsider the propriety of a per se ban on the admission
of polygraph evidence.324 Although for a time that belief seemed
prophetic,325 the trend died quickly.
Why did the polygraph fail to earn judicial acceptance? The
Supreme Court's 1998 decision in United States v. Scheffer26 seemingly
provides at least a partial answer. In Scheffer, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of Military Rule of Evidence 707, which categorically
disallowed the admission of polygraph evidence in courts-martial.3 27 In
doing so, the Court clearly expressed the disdain it held for the
polygraph by noting that "there is simply no way to know in a particular
case whether a polygraph examiner's conclusion is accurate, because
certain doubts and uncertainties plague even the best polygraph
exams."1328 Rule 707, said the Court, was "a rational and proportional
means of advancing the legitimate interest in barring unreliable
evidence." 329  The Scheffer decision therefore offered additional
ammunition to reviewing courts seeking to summarily bar polygraph
evidence from their courtrooms. 330
324. McCall, supra note 311, at 365 (noting, in 1996, that some federal courts "have begun to
reconsider and reject" a per se ban on polygraph testimony post Daubert).
325. See, e.g., United States v. Call, I29 F.3d 1402, 14o6 (toth Cir. 1997) (rejecting per se ban on
polygraph in light of Daubert); United States v. Cordoba, £04 F.3d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[Per se
rule] excluding unstipulated polygraph evidence is inconsistent with the 'flexible inquiry' assigned to
the trial judge by Daubert."); United States v. Posado, 57 F-3d 428, 433 (5th Cir. 1995) ("After
Daubert, a per se rule is not viable."); United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1361 (D. Ariz.
1995) ("The Court finds that polygraph evidence is sufficiently reliable under Daubert to be admitted
as scientific evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 702.").
326. 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
327. Id. at 317.
328. Id. at 312.
329. Id. (emphasis added).
330. Indeed, at first, the Daubert factors seemingly offered the appropriate analytical roadmap for
evaluating the admissibility of polygraph evidence. See David Gallai, Polygraph Evidence in Federal
Courts: Should It Be Admissible, 36 AM. CuM. L. REV. 87, 93-101 (1999) (collecting cases and
evaluating polygraph's admissibility pursuant to the Daubert factors before concluding that polygraph
results are inadmissible in federal court). Yet, based on the Supreme Court's unfavorable comments
about the polygraph in Scheffer, subsequent reviewing courts seemed free to summarily dispose of
arguments in favor of polygraph admissibility with little or no analysis. See, e.g., Goel v. Gonzales, 490
F.3d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 2007) (relying on Scheffer to summarily reject the use of polygraph reports in
immigration proceedings); United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 468-69 (6th Cir. 2oo6) (relying in
part on Scheffer to affirm the denial of disclosure to defendant that his codefendant failed a lie-
detector test); Ortega v. United States, 270 F.3d 540, 548 (8th Cir. 2001) (relying on Scheffer to reverse
government's attempt to base obstruction sentencing enhancement on polygraph's result); United
States v. Ruhe, 191 F.3d 376, 388 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[Scheffer] recently held that such per se bans on
polygraph tests are permissible."); United States v. Godin, 563 F. Supp. 2d 299, 300 (D. Me. 2008)
(relying in part on Scheffer to summarily deny defendant's request for public funds to allow him to
submit to a presentencing polygraph examination); United States v. Canter, 338 F. Supp. 2d 460, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("While the Court is mindful that Scheffer involved a challenge to a military rule of
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Wholly apart from Daubert and Scheffer, some courts continued to
reason, like several post-Frye decisions had before them,33' that
introducing polygraph results divested the jury of the opportunity to
evaluate witness credibility." Regardless of the test employed, however,
federal and state courts most often thematically recognize one simple
fact about polygraph evidence: it remains unreliable.333
Judges nationwide rightly reject polygraph evidence because there
exists no "science" behind the detection of deception. The follow-up
question seems obvious: why is all of this discussion about polygraphs
relevant if this Article is about interrogation techniques? Answering that
question should be equally as obvious: the Reid method of interrogation
is designed to accomplish the same goal as the polygraph-to detect
deception by subjects.334
Professor Richard A. Leo 33' has previously argued that the Behavior
Analysis Interview in particular is "premised on the same underlying
theory as the polygraph: that the act of deception produces regular and
discernable stress reactions in normally socialized individuals."336 Yet, as
evidence, the Court finds the Scheffer Court's rationale and discussion of the reliability of polygraph
evidence no less germane or compelling.").
331. See supra note 317.
332. See, e.g., United States v. Swayze, 378 F-3d 834, 837 (8th Cir. 2004) ("When two witnesses
contradict each other, juries, not polygraph tests, determine who is testifying truthfully."); United
States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1406 (ioth Cir. 1997) ("[Polygraph evidence] is often excluded because it
usurps a critical function of the jury and because it is not helpful to the jury, which is capable of
making its own determination regarding credibility."); State v. Engelhardt, 119 P.3d 1148, ii66 (Kan.
2005) (noting that the rule banning expert testimony about the polygraph is "attributable in part. . . to
protection of the jury's role as the factfinder").
333. See, e.g., United States v. Scarborough, 43 F-3d 1021. 1026 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that
polygraph results are "inherently unreliable"); United States v. Cordoba, 991 F. Supp. i199, 1199
(C.D. Cal. 1998) ("The court finds polygraphy has not achieved general acceptance in the scientific
community for courtroom use, the error rate for real-life polygraph tests is unknown, and there are no
controlling standards for polygraphy."), affd, 194 F-3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Black,
831 F. Supp. 120, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[P]olygraph evidence is not sufficiently reliable to be
admissible in a criminal trial or pre-trial hearing."); State v. Ulland, 943 P.2d 947, 954 (Kan. Ct. App.
1997) ("Absent a stipulation of the parties, the results of a polygraph examination are too unreliable
to be admissible at trial.").
334. See generally Minzner, supra note 22 (describing the Reid technique as a method used for
determining lie detection).
335. Professor Leo is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of San Francisco School of
Law and formerly a professor of psychology and criminology at the University of California, Irvine.
Richard A. Leo, Ph.D., J.D. Curriculum Vitae (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.law.usfca.edu/
faculty/fulltime/cv/leor.pdf. He has written five books and more than fifty articles on police
interrogation practices, false confessions, and wrongful convictions. Id. Professor Leo holds both a
J.D. and a Ph.D. in Jurisprudence and Social Policy (with a specialization in criminology and social
psychology). Id.
336. Leo, supra note 4, at 66; see Kassin, supra note 279, at 197 ("To help investigators determine
whether their suspects are telling the truth or lying. Inbau et al. (20o1) train investigators to use the
Behavior Analysis Interview, or BAI."); see also WHITE, supra note 22. at 26 ("[T]he Manual instructs
an interrogator as to how she can determine whether a suspect is guilty . .)
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Professor Leo observes, "[b]ecause no physiological or psychological
response unique to lying (and never present in truthfulness) has ever
been discovered, the theory of the polygraph and the Behavior Analysis
Interview remains prima facie implausible, leaving both diagnostic
methods especially prone to problems of interpreter bias, validity,
reliability and false positive outcomes." 337  Most problematically,
Professor Leo notes, "the data that Reid and Associates cite as support
for the efficacy of the Behavioral Analysis interview have never been
made public, and (assuming they even exist) they would appear to be
little more than an accumulation of unsystematic, post hoc observations
intended to verify their own preconceptions."338
The nine-step interrogation technique that would ordinarily follow
the Behavior Analysis Interview-if the interrogator remains convinced
of the subject's guilt-has garnered similar substantial criticism for its
inability to accurately assess or detect deception.339 Psychology Professors
Saul M. Kassin and Christina T. Fong performed an experiment in 1999
studying individuals' ability to accurately assess guilt or innocence.340 At
the outset, the pair observed that, like the Behavior Analysis Interview,
the nine-step interrogation method that followed was similarly designed
to aid interrogators in detecting deception.341
More substantively, Professors Kassin and Fong videotaped one
group of participants interrogated pursuant to the Reid method to
determine whether they committed a mock crime.342 A second group of
participants, some of whom were trained in the Reid method, watched
the videos and opined on (i) the guilt or innocence of each subject, and
(2) their confidence in their assessment of guilt or innocence. 343 The
results were as predictable as they were disturbing: First, judgment
accuracy rates were comparable to chance.3" Second, "training in the use
of verbal and nonverbal cues did not improve judgment accuracy." 345 In
an effort to explain why training did nothing to improve judgment
accuracy, the authors stated pointedly, "there is no solid empirical basis
for the proposition that these same cues reliably discriminate between
337. Leo, supra note 4, at 67; accord Kassin, supra note 279, at 197 ("[T]here is also no evidence to
support the diagnostic value of the verbal and nonverbal cues that investigators are trained to
observe.").
338. Leo, supra note 4, at 67 (emphasis added).
339. E.g., Kassin & Fong, supra note 25, at 514.
340. Id. at 499.
341. Id. at 500 (observing that the Reid technique specifically trains interrogators "on the analysis
of verbal and nonverbal cues to deception").
342. Id. at 501.
343. Id.




criminals and innocent persons accused of crimes they did not
commit.")-34
Finally, the authors reported, participants were over-confident in
their assessment of guilt or innocence.347 In the authors' words:
[W]e found among both trained and naive participants that judgment
accuracy and confidence were not significantly correlated, regardless of
whether the measure of confidence was taken before, after, or during
the task. Further demonstrating the meta-cognitive problems in this
domain is that confidence ratings were positively correlated with the
number of reasons (including Reid-based reasons) articulated as a
basis for judgments, another dependent measure not predictive of
accuracy. Training had a particularly adverse effect in this regard.
Specifically, those who were trained compared to those in the naive
condition were less accurate in their judgments of truth and deception.
Yet they were more self-confident and more articulate about the reasons
for their often erroneous judgments.'4
Accordingly, they conclude, "[w]ith regard to the finding that training in
the Reid technique did not increase accuracy, the results are
unambiguous."3
This analysis should sound eerily familiar. The polygraph machine is
designed to detect deception; remember, Reid himself once bragged that
his company "get[s] better results than a priest does."3 0 Remember also
Reid's claim that "when properly used," the lie-detector technique has
"an accuracy of 95%.""' And, of course, think back to the considerable
attention Reid and Inbau collectively received in the media for their lie-
detector method.35 2
Notwithstanding Reid and Inbau's protestations of accuracy, think
now of the judiciary's response to their lie-detector technique: polygraph
results are inadmissible. Why again? Because since 1923, polygraph
examiners (Reid included) have been unable to consistently convince
346. Id. at 511-12.
347. Id. at 512.
348. Id. (emphasis added). The study's authors performed their experiments in 1999. Selection of
this older study for this Article was intentional; indeed, one should feel uncomfortable knowing that
society has had access to this information for a decade now, yet courts continue to routinely admit
confessions obtained pursuant to the Reid method. For those wishing to confirm that the results of
Kassin and Fong's study are far from anomalous, see ALDERT VRi, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT:
PITFALLS AND OPPORTUNITIES (2d ed. 2oo8); Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Accuracy of
Deception Judgments, io PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. REV. 214 (2oo6): and Aldert Vrij et al., An
Empirical Test of the Behaviour Analysis Interview, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 329 (2oo6).
349. Kassin and Fong, supra note 25, at 5I2, accord Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 46, at 38
(discussing psychological tests demonstrating that people who have undergone training in judging the
accuracy of confessions are "significantly less accurate than those who did not [undergo the training] -
though they were more confident in their judgments [of guilt or innocence]").
350. Franklin, supra note 286, at 45.
351. Arther & Reid, Lie Detector in Paternity Cases, supra notel42, at 216 n.5.
352. See Associated Press, supra note 296, at 31; Burnham, supra note 295, at 13z Lydon. supra
note 294, at I.
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anyone-including the courts-that the "science" underlying the
polygraph should translate into admissible evidence.353 Society should be
particularly thankful for the appellate judiciary's wisdom; if you remain
unconvinced, then flip back a few pages and double-check the research
underlying Reid's lie-detector technique.354 The absence of research to
support that technique confirms what seems uniformly obvious to
professors, social scientists, and psychologists alike: there exists no
physiological or psychological response unique to lying. One more
obvious point bears mentioning: there is a difference between those who
talk about science and psychology and those who are credentialed to do
SO. 355
But an illogical disconnect persists. Like the polygraph or lie-
detector technique, the Reid method of interrogation is designed to
detect deception. And, like studies reflecting that the polygraph is about
as accurate as flipping a coin,356 other studies reflect similar rates of
accurate guilt or innocence assessments by interrogators trained in the
Reid method.5 Yet, unlike the judiciary's unwillingness to admit
polygraph evidence, judges routinely admit confessions taken pursuant
to the Reid method, without inquiring into the basis for Reid and Inbau's
claim that their methods introduced "science" into the interrogation
room. 35
353. Compare Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (rejecting primitive lie
detector device because it had not achieved "general acceptance" in the scientific community), with
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312 (1998) ("[C]ertain doubts and uncertainties plague even
the best polygraph exams.").
354. See supra notes 197-215 and accompanying text.
355. Paradoxically, although Reid and Inbau lacked the psychology training presumably required
to create psychological interrogation methods, they nevertheless suggested that polygraph examiners
possess a variety of credentials before courts should accept the results of their testing into evidence.
See People v. Leone, 255 N.E.2d 696, 699 n.4 (N.Y. 1969) ("Reid and Inbau suggest that before
permitting the results of a polygraph examination into evidence, the courts should require that (x) the
examiner have a college degree; (2) that he have six months of internship training; (3) that he have at
least five years' experience as a specialist in the field of lie detection; and (4) that the examiner's
testimony be based upon polygraph records that he produces in court and which are available for
cross-examination purposes."); see Arther & Reid, Lie Detector in Paternity Cases, supra note 142, at
216 n.5 ("Far less accuracy will prevail, however, when the examiner is lacking in basic qualifications,
adequate training, sufficient experience, general competence, or complete honesty.").
356. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
357. E.g., Kassin & Fong, supra note 25, at 512; Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 46, at 40.
358. See supra note 24 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., People v. Gonzalez, No. B154557,
2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11981, at *51 (Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2003) (upholding confession taken
pursuant to the Reid technique despite noting that it "undoubtedly pressured appellant to admit his
involvement"); State v. Cobb, 43 P-3d 855, 863 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting defendant's argument
that application of the Reid technique rendered his confession involuntary); State v. Gevan, No. C9-
02-443, 2002 Minn. App. LEXIS 1014, at *9 (Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2002) ("While deceit and trickery are
not condoned police practices, confessions obtained with this technique are admissible so long as the
specific practices used do not 'shock the conscience' or risk inducing a false confession."); State v.
Gentry, No. C9-96-2344, 1997 Minn. App. LEXIS 1064, at **Io-II (Ct. App. Sept. i6, 1997)
(rejecting defendant's voluntariness challenge); State v. Gardner, So P.3d 1262, 127o (Mont. 2003)
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The admission of confessions obtained by quasi science is
problematic given the simple analysis that should lead courts to wholly
reject the Reid interrogation method. If courts since 1923 have
consistently rejected the polygraph exam, 35  then logic dictates rejecting
the Reid method of interrogation for identical reasons. Similar logic
dictates one final troubling conclusion: because the judiciary had already
firmly rejected the polygraph method long before Inbau utilized similar
methodology in 1942 to formulate what is now the Reid technique, no
court should ever admit a confession obtained pursuant to the Reid
method against a confessing defendant.
B. APART FROM THE POLYGRAPH, THE REID TECHNIQUE ITSELF IS
PREMISED ON INADMISSIBLE JUNK SCIENCE
Most defense challenges to confessions focus on the possibility that
methods endorsed by the Reid technique induced their client to confess
falsely.' Intuitively, this makes sense: a warehouse full of research
reflects the potential for the Reid technique to produce false
confessions.36'Professor Leo in particular has extensively documented
the potential for modern interrogation methods to produce false
confessions.o362 Ofessor Leo observes that modem interrogation
methods are "developed to manipulate the decision-making of a person
who committed a crime," yet false confessions arise because of the
"inappropriate, improper and inept use of the methods of psychological
(upholding Reid confession where defendant failed to preserve the issue); State v. Ulch, No. CR-oo-
1461, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1866, at *ii (Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2002) (rejecting defendant's challenge
that application of the Reid technique violates due process); State v. Isola, No. 42472-6-1. 1999 Wash.
App. LEXIS 2018, at *4 (Ct. App. Nov. 29, 1999) (discussing Reid technique).
359. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ("We think the systolic blood
pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological
and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from
the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made.").
360. See, e.g., People v. Son, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871, 883 (Ct. App. 2ooo); State v. Ritt, 599 N.W.2d
802, 8to-ii (Minn. 1999); State v. Davis, 32 S.W.3d 603, 6o8 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
361. See infra notes 362-63.
362. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-
DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891 (2004); Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False
Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2oo6 Wis. L. REV. 479.484-85; Richard
A. Leo, False Confessions and Miscarriages of Justice Today, in THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM I69 (Richard A. Leo ed., 1997); Richard A. Leo, Miranda and the Problem of False
Confessions, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE AND POLICING 271 (Richard A. Leo & George C.
Thomas, III eds., 1998); Richard A. Leo, Miranda's Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence,
Game, 30 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 259, 269 (1996); Richard A. Leo, Some Thoughts About Police and Crime,
in THE CRIME CONUNDRUM: ESSAYS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 121 (Lawrence Friedman & George Fisher
eds., 1997); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations
of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Missing the Forest for the Trees: A
Response to Paul Cassell's " Balanced Approach" to the False Confession Problem, 74 DENy. U. L. REV.
1135 (1997); Ofshe & Leo, supra note 25; Ofshe & Leo, supra note 22, at 189.
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interrogation." 6 3 For example, Professor Leo argues that police "too
frequently become so zealously committed to a preconceived belief in a
suspect's guilt or so reliant on their interrogation methods that they
mistakenly extract an uncorroborated, inconsistent, and manifestly
untrue confession.",,364
Rather than dwell for too long on the Reid technique's propensity
to cause false confessions, however, this section focuses more basically
on the admissibility of a confession obtained pursuant to the Reid
method. In doing so, it argues that interrogators certified in the Reid
technique must be qualified as experts before any confession obtained
from a defendant pursuant to the Reid method may be introduced
against that defendant in court. Of course, given the absence of an
empirical scientific basis to support the Reid method, no interrogator
should be so qualified and, as a result, no confession obtained pursuant
to the Reid method should ever be admitted in court.
Reid and Inbau long claimed that their methods introduced
"psychological tactics" and "science" into the interrogation room. 6' The
belief, by now no doubt familiar to the reader, was that interrogators
could learn to perceive deceptive responses in suspects merely bY
learning how to discern deception from their behavioral responses.
That view remains unchanged today. Indeed, promotional materials for
seminars given by John E. Reid & Associates boast the ability to-in
three-days, no less-teach students "[h]ow to psychologically profile
suspects for the interrogation."367
Taking the federal standard as an illustrative example,368 the first
question is whether the Reid technique's attempted introduction of
"psychological tactics" into the interrogation room implicates Daubert's
applicability to "scientific evidence." Stated differently, is psychology a
"science" such that psychological testimony or evidence must comport
with Federal Rule of Evidence 702? That question is particularly
important given that Daubert's limited holding "left open questions
about whether [its] gatekeeping function and reliability/relevance factors
applied to such expert witnesses as airplane pilots, beekeepers, real
estate appraisers, accountants, auto mechanics-all of whom have
363. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 22, at 190.
364. Id. at 193.
365. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
366. INBAU ET AL., supra note 3, at 6-7.
367. JOHN E. REID & Assocs., INC., SEMINAR SCHEDULE 4 (2009) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.reid.com/training.programs/2oo9seminarbrochure.pdf.
368. This section relies on the federal judiciary and the Federal Rules of Evidence solely as an
illustrative example. Each state of course has its own rules of evidence, which include rules governing
the admission of expert evidence.
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particular expertise and experience that might help a trier of fact, but
who are clearly not scientists
At first, some post-Daubert courts were skeptical that Daubert's
standards for admitting scientific evidence would extend to psychology.370
Rightly or wrongly, psychology was grouped with so-called "soft
sciences," along with psychiatry, economics, anthropology, and
sociology.37' These, of course, are to be contrasted with the "hard
sciences" like biology, physics, and chemistry.7 The former, so the
rationale went, were incapable of controlled empirical testing and instead
involved clinical or experiential data.7 Despite the dissimilarities
between them, however, some courts drew no distinction between the
two and applied Daubert to all expert testimony." Those courts, as it
turned out, were prophetic.
In 1999, the Supreme Court held in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
that the trial judge's role as "gatekeeper" applies not only to "scientific"
testimony, but to all expert testimony-including that premised on
"'technical' and 'other specialized' knowledge."7 More specifically,
Daubert applied to all "expert matters described in Rule 702."'376The
Court reasoned that expert testimony might include specialized
observations, theory, or the application of a theory to a particular case.377
As a prerequisite for admission, said the Court, there must exist a
valid connection between the testimony and "the pertinent inquiry."3,7
And, when a litigant challenges the "factual basis, data, principles,
methods, or their application," the trial court "must determine whether
the testimony has 'a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of
369. Thomas Regnier, Barefoot in Quicksand: The Future of "Future Dangerousness" Predictions
in Death Penalty Sentencing in the World of Daubert and Kumho, 37 AKRON L. REV. 469, 496 (2o04).
370. See, e.g., United States v. Bighead, 128 F-3d 1329, 1330 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
Daubert analysis did not apply to a psychologist who testified on child sexual abuse because her
testimony was a result of interviewing many abuse victims, not on any scientific knowledge); Jenson v.
Eveleth Taconite Co., 13o F.3d 1287, 1297 (8th Cir. 1997) (doubting the applicability of Daubert to
"soft sciences" like psychology because "there are social sciences in which the research, theories and
opinions cannot have the exactness of hard science methodologies"); United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d
1337, 1342-43 (7th Cir. 1996) (remanding to lower court to determine whether Daubert would allow
psychiatric and social psychology testimony); United States v. DiDomenico, 985 F.2d 1159, 1171 (2d
Cir. 1993) ("'[S]oft science' expertise is less likely to overwhelm the common sense of the average
juror than 'hard science' expertise . . .."); United States v. Starzecpyzel, 88o F. Supp. 1027, 1041
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that Daubert was inapplicable to forensic document examination testimony).
371. Janine M. Kern & Scott R. Swier, Daubert, Kumho, and Its Impact on South Dakota
Jurisprudence: An Update, 49 S.D. L. REV. 217, 244 n.309 (2004).
372. Id.
373. David S. Caudill & Richard E. Redding, Junk Philosophy of Science?: The Paradox of
Expertise and Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 685.723 n.220 (2000).
374. E.g., United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 1995).
375. 526 U.S. 137, 141 (19)
376. Id. at 149.
377. Id.
378. Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993)).
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[the relevant] discipline."" Significantly, the Court suggested that a trial
court could consider the factors it outlined in Daubert "when doing so
will help determine that testimony's reliability.',38o
Analyzing the Reid technique from here seems straightforward.
Given the Reid technique's claimed basis in "science" and "psychology"
alongside Kumho Tire's reach into "soft sciences," it is time for defense
attorneys nationwide to challenge the Reid method's "factual basis, data,
principles, methods, or [its] application."3' Assuming they do so, even a
cursory look into how the Daubert factors might apply to the Reid
technique foretells the defense bar's success.
Daubert first suggests that trial courts evaluate "whether [the
proposed scientific knowledge] can be (and has been) tested."32 Given
that there exists no physiological or psychological response unique to
lying, testing the Reid technique's claimed ability to detect lies is a tough
proposition. To begin with, the inability to determine what constitutes
ground truth suggests that testing the Reid technique borders on the
impossible. Moreover, as this Article has gone to great lengths to note,
there is no basis for the Reid method-scientific or otherwise.3 Even if
the Reid technique were grounded in sound scientific or psychological
principles, how do we know that confessions-especially those left
uncorroborated-obtained pursuant to the Reid method are not false?
Second, Daubert suggests that trial courts evaluate "whether the
theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication."" The first question, of course, is who constitutes the
relevant peer group? If it is interrogators trained in the Reid method,
then peer review naturally favors admission. If, however, the relevant
peer group is social psychologists, then peer review disfavors
379. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).
380. Id. at 141.
381. Id. at 149.
382. 509 U.S. at 593.
383. To be fair, Professor Leo recognizes that the Reid method relies on psychological techniques.
See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 22, at 190. The problem, however, is that the Reid technique stumbled
into psychology rather than basing the method on it. Cf id (blaming false confessions on the Reid
method's "inept use of the methods of psychological interrogation"). Perhaps this sheds some light
onto the false confession problem; in other words, Inbau and Reid never reasonably considered the
potential for their method to induce false confessions simply because they could not. Given that the
method itself was generated solely on observations-rather than education - it seems eminently
reasonable to assume that Inbau and Reid simply lacked the training to consider whether their
techniques could induce subjects to falsely confess. Notwithstanding a similar absence of psychological
or academic credentials, the modem Reid method authors steadfastly maintain that the technique, if
administered correctly, cannot produce false confessions. See Jayne & Buckley, supra note 24, at 72
("A psychologically healthy suspect will not engage in behavior that will jeopardize [his] self-
interests."). But see People v. Melock, 599 N.E.2d 941. 951-52 (Ill. 1992) (reversing defendant's
conviction-premised on a false confession-where interrogator obtained defendant's confession only
after he falsely told defendant that he failed a polygraph exam).
384. 509 U.S. at 593.
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admission.8"' And, although Reid and Inbau have published significantly
on the Reid technique, their publications have not appeared in any
relevant journal recognized by the American Psychological
Association. 86 It bears noting, however, that critics of the Reid technique
have consistently published in some of the most recognized psychology
journals in the nation.38 7
The final two Daubert factors require equally little discussion. The
third factor counsels courts to consider "the known or potential rate of
error."388 Determining known error rates for the Reid technique is likely
impossible given that the technique itself was not premised on published
error rates. Assessing known error would in any event require knowing
the actual or ground truth to determine whether interrogators
successfully elicited a true confession. Yet, as noted, studies reflect that
training in the Reid technique did not enhance an interrogator's ability
to detect deception in an individual.38 9 Recall Professor Kassin's study
revealing that learning the Reid technique may be "counterproductive[]
as a method of distinguishing truth and deception.""
Finally, trial courts should consider whether the science has
achieved "general acceptance" in the relevant scientific community.39'
Given Reid and Inbau's claim that the Reid technique is premised in
psychology, the relevant scientific community would appear to be
psychologists. It would be hard indeed to justify a group composed solely
of Reid-trained interrogators because the very fact that they use the Reid
technique indicates that they accept the "science." Yet, as previously
noted,392 psychologists may agree with Inbau that the Reid technique
utilizes "psychological tactics," but they dispute the method's claim that
it can successfully avoid eliciting false confessions. In sum, the Supreme
Court has provided a test to assess the validity of expert evidence and the
Reid technique utterly fails that test. Any truly scientific technique
should, at a minimum, satisfy Daubert's factors with ease.
385. See Kassin & Fong, supra note 25, at 512.
386. Although Northwestern's Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology is a giant in academic
legal circles, it is unsurprisingly not a publication recognized by the American Psychological
Association. See APA and Affiliated Journals, http://www.apa.org/journals/by-subject.html#social
(last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
387. See, e.g., Kassin & Fong, supra note 25 (publishing in Law & Human Behavior); Kassin et al.,
supra note 30 (same); Saul M. Kassin et al., "Id Know a False Confession if I Saw One": A
Comparative Study of College Students and Police Investigators, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 211 (2005)
(same). The Law and Human Behavior Journal has a rejection rate of seventy-six percent. See
SUMMARY REPORT OF JOURNAL OPERATIONS, 2008 (20o8), available at http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/
features/2oo8-operations.pdf.
388. 509 U.S. at 594.
389. See supra note 349.
390. Kassin & Fong, supra note 25, at 532.
391. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
392. See supra notes 362-64.
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The question of where to go from here is best saved for another day
and another article. Suffice it to say for now, though, that Reid and
Inbau's service to this country cannot be overstated; indeed, suspects
owe a debt of gratitude to these two giants who successfully eradicated
the "third degree" from interrogation rooms nationwide. But we no
longer live in the 1940s, and, not surprisingly, we no longer drive 1940S
automobiles, practice early-twentieth-century medicine, or dial rotary
phones. Why, then, are police still using 1940S methods of interrogation?
The time has come to shut down the profit-based John E. Reid &
Associates and replace it with an interdisciplinary effort that relies on
work published in credible psychology journals, written by credentialed
scholars.393
CONCLUSION
As my criminal procedure professor observed, "To question the
propriety of some of the interrogation methods recommended by Inbau
and Reid in 1953 and '63 is not to deny that we owe the senior author a
great deal for antiquating the interrogation practices of '23 and "33.""9
I have no training or background in psychology. Common sense of
course suggests that I am therefore unqualified to teach even a basic
psychology course. Like me, Fred Inbau and John Reid have no
psychological training or background. They too, then, presumably could
not have taught even a basic psychology course. How then could they
author the "Bible" for interrogation training? The answer is as simple as
it is disconcerting: they could not.
What then is the solution? Dispense with criminal interrogations as
a tool? Of course not. Instead, common sense should dictate that the
Reid method-although perhaps a helpful stopgap in 1942-is no more
able to reliably separate the innocent from the guilty now than it was at
the time of its creation. Just like any other profession, only individuals
qualified in psychology can opine on appropriate psychological
interrogation methods.
Accordingly, the time has come to dispense with the Reid method's
sweeping and unsupported presume-guilt approach in favor of creating a
newer more collaborative approach to interrogation methods. Only by
393. The Author of this Article cannot help but wonder in passing what Reid and Inbau would
think of the modern John E. Reid & Associates. The company's website suggests that its focus is more
on financial gain than anything else. Several aspects of the site push marketing phrases, seminar costs,
or certification fees on the viewer. See John E. Reid & Associates, http://www.reid.com/ (last visited
Jan. I2, 20o) ("If it doesn't say 'The Reid Technique"' ... it's not John Reid & Associates!"
(alteration in original)). That focus arguably dishonors the tremendous social service both Reid and
Inbau performed by professionalizing the police force and moving it away from harsh "third degree"
methods of interrogation.
394. Kamisar, supra note 177, at 733.
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assimilating the experience of law enforcement and prosecutors along
with criminal and social psychologists can we create interrogation
methods designed to produce reliable and admissible confessions. Until
then, all we can do is lament the disconnect between the outdated Reid
technique and the standards of evidentiary admissibility.
